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often  include  indicator  targeting,  in whichl non-incomne  vote  simultaneously  about  the  level of taxation  and  the
characteristics  (such as race,  gender,  or  land  ownership)  degree  of targeting  - shows  that  positive  levels of
that  are correlated  with  income  aret used  to target  limited  targeted  transfers  will nor  exist in equilibrium  (an
funds  to groups  likely  to include  a concentration  of the  unsurprising  finding,  given Plott's  1968  thieorem).  It also
poor.  shows  that  a voting  equilibrium  often  will exist with  no
Previous  work  shows  that  efficient  use of  a fixed  targeting  but  with  non-zero  taxation  and  redistribution.
budget  for poverty  reduction  requires  such  targeting,  *  In a game  in which  the  policymaker  chooses  the
either  because  agents'  income  cannot  be observed  or to  degree  of targeting  while  voters  choose  the level  of
reduce  distortionary  incenitiv's  arising  from  redistributive  taxation,  the redistributive  efficiency  gains  from  tagging
interventions.  may well fail to outvweigh the  resulting  reduction  in funds
Inspite  of this, (ielbach  and  Pritchett  question  the  available  for  redistribution.
political  viability  of targeting.  After constructing  a mnodel  These  results  may be extended  readily  to account  for
that  is basically  an  extenlsion of Akerlof's  1978 model  of  altruistic  agents.
"tagging,"  they  derive  three  main results:  Gelbach  and Pritchett  stress  that  even  when  these
Akerlof's  result  continues  to hold:  that,  ignoring  results  hold,  the  alternative  to targeted  transfers  - a
political  considerations,  not  only  will targeting  be  universally  received  lump-sum  grant  financed  through  a
desirable  but  recipients  of the targeted  transfer  will  proportional  tax  - will nonetheless  be  supported
receive  a greater  total  transfer  than  they  would  if  politicallv  and will be quite  progressive  relative  to  the
targeting  were  not  possible.  pretransfer  income  distribution.
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1  Introduction
Fiscal conditions requiring reductions in government expenditures often produce a dialogue
like the following  between a policymaker (PM) and a technocrat economist (TE):
TE: We must reduce the deficit. Therefore, spending on category X (e.g.social security,
telephone subsidies, education, health, irrigation water) must be cut.
PM: But  if we cut the budget for X, the poor will be hurt,  since they benefit from
government expenditures on X programs.
TE: Don't  worry. The current incidence of benefits from X expenditures is uniform,
regressive, or at best only modestly progressive. Therefore, if we restrict  X spending to the
poor, we can both cut the X budget and reduce poverty.
PM: But the administrative costs of identifying  the poor correctly would be prohibitive.
TE: Don't worry. Even if we can't observe actual income, we can find easily observable
indicators-like region of residence economic sector, occupation, gender, ethnicity, or land-
owning status-that  are correlated with household income. So long as these indicators are
highly enough correlated with income, we can target our X-expenditures to people based
on these indicators and still do more with less.
PM: But you assume that  the budget for X will remain fixed. If I narrow the incidence
of X-related benefits by concentrating spending on targeted households, I also narrow the
constituency for spending on X. In fact, the ultimate outcome will be further cuts in the
budget  X sufficient to  wipe out  any efficiency-related  poverty reductions resulting from
targeting.
Who is right? The theoretical foundation for the technocrat economist's argument was
provided by George Akerlof in his 1978 paper, "The  Economics of Tagging As Applied
to the Optimal Income Tax".  Akerlof develops  a  strong and coherent argument  for the
possibility that  conditioning income transfers on immutable characteristics of potential
recipients allows a more efficient  social welfare system. The essential problem solved-or at
least mitigated-by the use of tagging (Akerlof's term for indicator targeting) is the tradeoff
between the incentive costs of distortionary marginal income taxes and the social welfare
gains of income or consumption redistribution. As the technocrat economist notes in the
dialogue above, targeting is possible when some indicator set I  can be used to condition
transfers to recipients, so that  when a person scores highly on some criterion C(I),  she
is 'targeted"  to receive a transfer (in addition to any other untargeted transfers she may
receive).  When these indicators are not easily manipulable, a  targeted  transfer will be
essentially a lump-sum transfer for those who  receive  it, and the advantages of such transfers
(as opposed to  those conditioned on manipulable characteristics) are well known. 2 As
Akerlof shows in what he calls the "rudimentary Mirrlees-Fair"  setting (discussed formally
below), when lump-sum targeting is possible, transfers to targeted individuals exceed both
21n industrialized  nations,  where income is observable  (for the  most part),  these  advantages  largely derive
from  the  fact  that  lump-sum  transfers  reduce  or eliminate  incentive  distortions.  As the  policymaker  in our
dialogue  points  out,  in  LDCs  the issue is just  as often  the unobservability  of income.
1transfers  to the untargeted  and transfers  in a world in which no targeting  is possible.  Akerlof
points  out that  general theorems  concerning the relative  merits  of targeting  are not possible
in a  world in  which indicators  may be  affected by  agents'  behavior.  We follow Akerlof in
ignoring  this problem:  as he notes,  its treatment  simply makes the issue an empirical,  rather
than  theoretical,  in character.
We laud  the  motives  underpinning  proposals  to use indicator  targeting. 3 However, the
policymaker's  objections  may have merit:  we believe that  serious questions  exist concerning
the  political  viability  of targeting.  In  the  rest  of  this  paper,  we  develop  a  model  that
essentially  generalizes  Akerlof's.  The  two  primary  differences  are  that  we introduce  a
third,  middle-income,  class of agents  (Akerlof has  only high-  and  low-income  people)  and
allow  for  "unemployment'  of the  poor  and  middle  class.  Adding  a  third  income  class  of
course  is necessary  for any consideration  of political issues.  The  introduction  of individual
income  uncertainty  via  unemployment  reflects  our  belief  that  insurance  motives  play  a
significant  role in the  determination  of the degree of income redistribution  in a society.  The
other  possible  determinant  is altruism.  While the model  can get  along perfectly  well when
altruism  is accounted  for, we believe that  altruism  in fact  is not a primary  determinant  of
redistributive  politics.  We offer a full section below treating  both  theoretical  and  empirical
considerations  related  to this  issue.
We make  one  critical  methodological  assumption.  While  our  use  of a  continuum  of
agents  rules out  aggregate  uncertainty  over the  number  of people  in  a given income  class
receiving  targeted  transfers,  we assume  that  from  the  point  of view of any  given  person,
the  event  of receiving  a  targeted  transfer  is random.  Without  this  assumption  (and  in
the  absence  of altruistic  motives  for redistribution)  the  politics  of targeting  is  trivial:  if
the  set of agents  receiving  targeted  transfers  has more  than  half the  political  power in the
society,  maximal  targeting  will be observed,  while no targeting  will be observed  otherwise.
Of course, this  situation  is uninteresting  from a modeling  point  of view, but  we also believe
that  it fails to reflect a sizable number  of actually  proposed  targeting  systems,  particularly
in developing  countries.4
3Hereafter  all references  to 'targeting' refer  only to the type of indicator targeting we define  formally
below.
4As for developed  countries,  e.g. the U.S.,  our formulation  may be les realistic, primarily  because  we
asume independence  of the processes  generating  bad income  shocks  and receipt  of the targeted transer. In
fact,  one is eligible for  food stamps  only  if one passes income  and  asset  tests,  which quite  certainly  will be
correlated  with  shocks  to  current-period  income,  like unemployment.  The  important  fact  is  that  it  is not
correct  to sy  that  all targeting  is deterministic,  i.e.  that  people always know whether  or not  they  will receive
targeted  transfers.  Some  people of course  will know that  they  never will receive such transfers:  men  in the
U.S. do not receive AFDC. But as Congres  moves  toward ending the entitlement status of myriad targeted
transfers, it will no longer be true that  targeted people know that  they will receive targeted  transfers.  In
any case,  we do not  believe that  taking  these considerations  into  account  is worth  doing  here,  both  because
we focus  in  this  paper  on  LDCs and  because  such  a modification  actually  would  make  our  analytical  case
stronger,  since  it  would  reduce  the  number  of states  of  nature  under  which  targeting  benefits  the  middle
class.
21.1  Politics  and  Indicator  Targeting
We take two distinct approaches in modelling  political equilibrium. The first uses a classical
social choice model, in which binary elections are held between pairs of alternatives,  which
are ordered pairs specifying  a tax rate and the percent-ge of the budget allocated to targeted
transfers.  In this model, an equilibrium is defined in the traditional  way: a  point z  is an
equilibrium if and only if no other point y is strictly preferred to x by a majority of voters5.
In section 4 we derive two basic results using this equilibrium concept.  First, we show that
no equilbrium can exist with positive levels of the targeted transfer.6 This result is entirely
unsurprising in light of Plott's  (1968) well-known  and restrictive conditions for majority
voting equilibria.  However, our second social choice result is quite a bit stronger:  under
plausible conditions, no targeting is an equilbrium of the voting model. We stress that  in
this equilibrium, a (possibly sizable) universal transfer will exist, enabling redistribution.
The force of this result depends on the subtle but critical distinction between the fol-
lowing two statements:  1) 'No point y  x  z is an equilibrium"; 2) "The point z is unbeaten
in majority voting by all points y #  z (i.e. x is an equilibrium)". This distinction is critical
because it may well  be (indeed it is often) the case that no voting equilibria exist.  In such
cases, non-equilibrium status  hardly is a reasonable criticism of any point, since all other
points have the same flaw!' However,  when an equilibrium does exist, political actors flout
it at their peril, so that economic  advisers (like TE in the dialogue above) who suggest that
policymakers abandon an equilibrium position risk being ignored altogether.8
Our second approach is to imagine a game played between the  policymaker and the
electorate, with simple Nash equilibrium being our solution concept.  The policymaker is
allowed to choose the proportion of the budget spent on targeted transfers, and  then an
election is held to determine the level of taxation conditional on the policymaker's choice.
We make use of the well-known  median voter result, which is appropriate in this  context
since once the degree of targeting is fixed, only one dimension of policy (the level of the
budget) remains to be sorted out through the political process 9. Within this median voter
approach, we distinguish two possible versions of our game. In the first, the policymaker
takes the  evel of taxation as given. ln the second, she takes account of political constraints
by taking afunction r-(k)  as given,  where k is the proportion of the budget spent on targeted
transfers and  T  is the function describing the median voter's optimal tax conditional on
"As  discussed  in Section  4, we  weaken  the defitition of equilibrium  to requie a majority  of voting  power,
rather  than  of voters,  to allow  ior the likelihood  that political  power  is distributed non-uniformly  throughout
the population
'As stated  in the text,  this result  actually  is a special  case; the general  result, discussed  in Appendix  2,
is that there is sero  probability  that a majority voting  equilibrium  exists  with positive  levels  of the targeted
tranfer.
"This remark is even more appropriate in light of McKelvey's (1978) remarkable demonstration  that
when the equilibrium set is empty, all points belong to the same cycle met,  so that  there is likely to be no
social choice-theoretic basis for eliminating any points from consideration.
'Provided,  of course that  other political agents may propose the equilibrium point.  We should note,
moreover, that when no targeting is an equilibrium, smal  perturbations of preferences do not in general
ruin its equilibrium status, despite Plott's result that when interior equilibria exist (in our context, this means
equilibrium at positive levels of targeted  transfers) they are not robust to smali changes in preferences.
'The  other principal requirement for use of the  median voter theorem, single-peaked preferences, will
follow trivially from our mumption  that  agents are risk  averse.
3k (we show below that  this approach is mathematically proper).  It is trivial to show that
when the policymaker takes account of political constraints, i.e. in the second version, she
never does worse-and almost always does better-than  when she does not.
Moreover,  we show that it is quite possible for the optimal politically-constrained level of
targeting to be zero-even though casual observation (e.g. large differences  in income across
regions, ethnic groups, occupations) may point to significant social welfare improvements
from positive levels of targeting using available  indicators. This result has perhaps the most
"economic" intuition of our findings. When people are unlikely enough to receive targeted
transfers, positive levels of targeting may be thought of as a tax on the activity of publicly
financed consumption insurance. Since in our model the amount of consumption shifting
done is a monotonic transformation of the level of taxation, we can think of taxation as the
"good" being "purchased". Hence  for people unlikely enough to receive targeted transfers,
targeting may be thought of as a tax on-or price increase of-the "good" of taxation.  The
question of how the  level of taxation changes when the degree of targeting changes thus
boils down to  the  standard  tug of war between substitution  and  income effects:  while
the higher price of unemployed-  relative to employed-state consumption makes employed-
state consumption relatively more  attractive at the margin, it also makes a given amount of
unemployed-state consumption more expensive, requiring higher expenditures on the latter.
Since we are operating in the expected utility framework,  the crucial "parameter" of interest
in resolving the substitution-income effect question will be the elasticity of substitution  of
ma.rginal  utility, which is also the coefficient  of relative risk aversion, across states of the
world.  We often will use CRRA preferences, though this assumption is not  critical (by
changing the word 'parameter"  to "function", we can treat general preferences). When the
degree  of relative risk aversion is (relatively) small, the substitution  effect prevails, with
the result that  the politico-equilibrium  tax rate (and hence the overall budget for transfers)
falls as the level of targeting rises. In this situation, it is possible for the optimal policy to
be no targeting of transfers: the efficiency  gains from targeting may be outweighed by an
asociated  loss in the budget for redistribution.
Both of these results regarding the political viability of targeting stand in stark contrast
to Akerlof's proposition.  As he notes, his model is highly stylized, so that  one might be
tempted to  argue that  the world described in our model-even in the absence of political
constraints-simply does not characterize one in which targeting would be useful anyway. In
fact, as we show in Section 3, with only one very weak and natural  assumption, Akerlof's
first result-that  some targeting always is optimal-generalizes directly to our model.  This
fact is intuitive,  for the basic reason that  more instruments gives the policymaker more
freedom in designing policy; a small amount of targeting thus  almost always brings an
efficiency  improvement, verifying  the generality of Akerlof's result (in a non-political world).
1.2  LDCs  and  Indicator  Targeting
In LDCs, indicator targeting is proposed not only as a means to reduce incentive problems
(the focus of Akerlof's model), but  also because conditioning transfers income simply is
infeasible.  In one common type of indicator targeting, a limited data  set  (say, a house-
hold survey) is used to establish a relationship between some readily observable household
4characteristics  (e.g.  region  of residence)  and  poverty  (or  income  or  consumption).  This
relationship  then  can be used to condition  transfers  to the enitire  population  based  on the
identified  characteristics  rather  than  on actual  income.
For instance,  in  a particularly  interesting  empirical  application  of indicator  targeting,
Glewwe (1990) finds  that  the  poverty  minimizing  policy in  urban  Cote  d'Ivoire  is to give
all transfers  to  households  in  the  East  Forest  region.  Of course,  seen  through  an  ez post
lens, this  proposal  implies that  no household not located  in the East  Forest-no  matter  what
its  actual  income-would  have  any  chance  to receive a  transfer,  and  hence  would have  no
self-interested  incentive  to  support  the  proposal.  As Glewwe stresses,  this  example  paints
a  particularly  stark  picture  of the  obvious  and  fundamental  political  economy  problem
inherent  in  deterministic  indicator  targeting  ex post of the  decision on  the  indicators  and
the  criterion  function
Our argument  is deeper:  we show that  even ex ante, before the  criterion  function  C(I)
is known, targeting  may  have adverse  political economy consequences.  For example,  in an
election  between  two parties,  one  campaigning  on  a platform  involving more  focused  (i.e.
targeted)  delivery  of benefits and  the other  proposing  the opposite,  C(I)  need not be known
for the  targeting  party  to  be defeated.  Alternatively,  a party  in  power for  the  forseeable
future  might  be  forced to  reduce  overall  redistributive  expenditures  in order  to  increase
targeting." 0 In either  case,  political  opposition  is to  the  possible outcomes  of targeting.
But  if the  "wrong"  party  is elected,  or if budget  cuts  are large enough,  targeting  proposals
may  result in lower realized welfare for the poor.  Moreover, insofar as parties  that  generally
support  targeting  also support  other  economic reforms thought  to be beneficial, proponents
of these  other  reforms should  be  sensitive  to  the  practical  possibility  that  political  losses
resulting  from  targeting  proposals  may  not  be separable  from  these  other  reforms.  The
possibility  that  proposing targeting  will have serious  political  consequences  is no  less real
than  are these  consequences  themselves.
The  rest  of this  paper  procedes  as follows.  In  Section  2, we present  a  brief  summary
of Akerlof's  model  and  his  result.  We then  describe  the  components  of our  model.  In
Section  3 we discuss the optimal  transfer  regime in a world where the  policymaker  need not
worry  about  political  support.  Then  in Section  4 we embed  the  model  in a  social  choice
framework.  In Section  5, we take  a  Nash  equilibrium  approach  to  the  political  economy
of targeting,  letting  the  policymaker  choose  the  degree of targeting  while  the  population
votes over  the  tax  rate  conditional  on  the  policymaker's  choice.  In Section  7, we discuss
both  theoretical  and  empirical  issues related  to  altruism.  In Section  6 we describe  existing
empirical  literature  (related  to  targeting  in developing  countries)  and  policy  implications,
and  we argue that  our model does a reasonable  job of capturing  the  basic characteristics  of
proposals  made  in this  literature.  In Section  8 we conclude.  Three  appendixes  contain,  in
order,  proofs of several results  of the basic model, a generalization  of the results of Section  4,
and  some technical  details  regarding  the  introduction  of altruism  in section  7.
10We imagine, for example, a system of government in which an  executive branch may determine  the
basic form of transfer distribution, while 'the  voters'  or, more realistically, a legislative branch, determines
the overall budget. This framework is developed in detail below.
52  The  Model
We begin  by  summarizing  Akerlof's  model  (using our  notation),  and  then  set  up  our  own
model.
2.1  Akerlof's  Model
There  is a continuum  of agents having measure one.  Half the population  is skilled, while the
other  half is unskilled.  There  are  two kinds of jobs,  easy and  hard,  and  they  pay  it and  r,
respectively;  unskilled  workers can do easy jobs only, while skilled workers can do either  job.
Utility  of income is given by a  twice differentiable,  increasing  and strictly  concave  function
u.  Easy jobs  carry  no disutility  of labor,  but  associated  with  hard  jobs  is an effort  cost  c,
which enters  the  utility of hard-job  workers additively.  Hence in the absence  of government
intervention,  unskilled  workers have utility  u(it),  while skiUed workers  have utility
u(r)  - c,  if the  hard job is chosen
u(p),  if the easy job is chosen
So long as u(r)  - u(p)  > c, skilled workers take hard jobs.  We now introduce  lump-sum
taxation  and  transfers.  Letting  T,  and  Tu be  the  tax  (transfer)  for skilled  and  unskilled
workers respectively,  in any equilibrium  with positive  levels of T  and  Tu, we have the incen-
tive compatibility  constraint  that  u(r  - T.) - u(i  + Tu) > c and  the  budget  constraint  that
T  = Tu (since the  two types  of workers have equal  population  sizes).  It  is straightforward
to  show  that  when  the  policymaker's  objective  is to  maximize  the  sum  of utilities,  both
constraints  bind  in equilibrium,  so that  everyone has equal  utility  at  the optimum.
Akerlof then  introduces  targeting  in the  following way. Some proportion  a  of the  pop-
ulation  of unskilled  workers is assumed  to be targeted,  so that  the  government  may  make
separate  lump-sum  transfers  to these people.  The policymaker  now has  the instruments  t8,
tu,n  and  tut,  which  are  (respectively)  the  tax  on  skilled  workers,  the  tax  on  (if  negative)
or transfer  to  (if  positive)  unskilled,  non-targeted  workers, and  the  transfer  to  unskilled,
targeted  workers.  The incentive compatibility  constraint  is now u(r  - t,)  - u(y  + tun)  >  C;
we use tun rather  than  tug because  skilled workers are  untargeted.  It  is in this  sense  that
this  form of targeting  is lump-sum  in nature:  no matter  what  they  do,  there  is no way for
untargeted  people to  obtain  the  targeted  transfer.  The  budget  constraint  (when  incentive
compatibility  is satisfied)  is now t8 =  6tut + (1 - 6)tun.  Letting  asterisks  denote  optimal
values,  Akerlof's  achievement  is his demonstration  that  if u(r)  - c > u(A),
1) tut >  tun and
2) tut  > Tu.
In words,  l)  says that  the  optimal  transfer  to targeted  unskilled  workers is larger  than
the  transfer  to  untargeted,  unskilled  workers, while  2) says  that  the  optimal  transfer  to
targeted  workers exceeds  the  transfer  they  receive when  targeting  is not  possible.  This  is
precisely  the sense  in which targeting  means 'more  for the  poor".
However, both  results  suggest  the  presence  of a significant  political  economy  problem:
the  use of targeting  drives a  wedge between  the  two groups  of poor  agents,  both  of which
6otherwise  would support  some form of redistribution  rather  than  none.  This  point  is made
most  stark  by  Akerlof's  observation  that  it  is possible  for  t,u,, to  be  negative  ,  so  that
untargeted,  unskilled  agents  pay a  tax; why  would people  expecting  to  be  taxed  under  a
targeted  regime  support  that  regime  over an untargeted  one in  which  they  would  receive
benefits?  We now  describe  the model we use to consider  this  question.
2.2  Our  Model:  Description
The  population  in our  economy has mass  one,  and  there  are  three  classes of people:  rich,
middle  income, and  poor;  we use the  subscripts  r,  m, and 1, respectively,  to refer  to  them.
Each  group  has  a  probability  distribution  over  employment  status  and  a  corresponding
maximum  marginal  product  when employed.  For simplicity,  we assume  that  the  probability
distribution  for  the poor and  middle income groups is the samell:  with  probability  p  >  0,
these  agents wiil receive zero pre-transfer  income, and  with probability  q  =  1 - p, they  wiU
receive income according  to the jobs they  choose.  We assume that  the  respective  maximum
marginal  products  of members  of the  rich, middle  income, and  poor  groups  are  r-,  1, and
p,  with r'  >  1  >  p.  An agent  first finds out  her employment  status  and  then,  if employed,
chooses a job to  work in.  We assume that  for each maximum  marginal  product  level, there
is a corresponding  job paying  that  marginal  product  as a wage, and  there  are no other jobs.
An agent  can choose to work in any job whose wage does not exceed her maximum  marginal
product.  Thus  rich people  can  work in any  of the  three  jobs,  middle  income  agents  can
work in  the two lower paying  jobs, and  the  poor  can work only in the  lowest  paying  jobs.
There  is no disutility  of labor,  so that  the  only incentive  compatibility  issues we will have
to consider  concern  employed  workers' choice of jobs.
We classify our three  groups along two further  dimensions:  diversification  of income and
tax status.  All agents working in jobs paying more than  p must pay taxes,  but those working
in  p jobs  need  not."2 The  rich (mass  a,)  have guaranteed  income  (i.e.  can  diversify),  so
that  if they  choose  to  work in jobs that  pay  r,  they  will have income  of r  =  qrr  with
probability  one.  We can justify  the guaranteed  income of the  rich either  by assuming  that
they  really  are not  subject  to income uncertainty  (q,  =  1), or that  they  have  access to  an
actuarially  fair insurance  market,  in which case, so long as they  exhibit  some degree of risk
aversion,  rich agents  will insure  fully.  For convenience,  and  without  loss of generality,  we
will put  qr  1, so that  r-  = r.  Middle class (mass  a,m) and  poor  agents cannot  diversify.
We define  the  tax  base  as  y, so  that  y  =  o,r  +  qam,  when  everyone  works  in  jobs
paying  their  maximum  marginal  products.  The assumption  that  y <  q is needed  below to
ensure  that  the  tax  chosen in a social choice setting  is less than  unity13. If the  rich work in
"The  social choice results we will state are completely  invariant to changes  in this assumption, tlhough
our results on the optimality of positive levels of targeting  are not.  Nonetheless, the invalidation  of these
results would require  pi < Pm, which seems counterintuitive.
12There is a potential consistency problem here: how is it that  we assume people pay an income tax when
income is unobservable? Any proportional tax, e.g.  a VAT, would do; alternatively, we might think of the
tax and transfer sides of government activity as unconnected, so that a revenue agency collects payroll taxes
while a benefits agency pays them out, and the two agencies are unable (or unwilling) to match up records.
In  ny event, we believe that  this issue is of minor importance.
1
3This assumption might seem objectionable, since it appears to say  that  pre-transfer  mean income is
7r'-marginal  product  jobs but  middle  income agents work in  s-marginal  product  jobs,  then
we will have  y  =  a,r;  if everyone works in  yt-marginal product  jobs,  then  y  =  0, i.e.  no
one  pays taxes.  We will see below that  the  rich never will choose  to work in  middle  class
jobs,  so we need  not consider y for those  cases.
Any  transfers  are  financed  by  a  linear  tax  r  E  [0, 1], and  two kinds  of transfers  are
possible.  The  first  is  a  universal,  or  nontargeted  transfer  N;  everyone  in  the  economy
receives  this  subsidy.  The second  is a  targeted  transfer,  6, which  is received  by only  the
population  proportion  6  =  Eiaii,,  i  =  I,m,r,,  where  6i is  the  proportion  of agents  of
type  i who  receive  6.  Given  our  assumptions  of probabilistic  targeting  and  a  continuum
of agents,  bi also  is the  probability  that  any  given person  of type  i receives  the  targeted
transfer.  Throughout  the  paper,  we will assume that  6, = 0, so that  no rich agents  receive
6; thus  6 = a1 61  + cimm  We stress  that  the  policymaker  is permitted  to condition  targeted
transfers  neither  on  realized  income  level nor  on  employment.  This  assumption  captures
the  policymaker's  first  objection  (in our  opening  dialogue)  to targeting,  namely  that  it is
not  feasible  for  administrative  reasons.  However, since  6 > 6 m  >0  -6,,  using  targeted
transfers  allows the  policymaker  to avoid giving benefits  to the  rich,  who are known  not  to
"need"  them,  while directing  them  to the poor and  middle class, at  least some of whom do
need  them.  This  fact  makes targeting  more efficient in a non-political  world."4
We do not endogenize within the model the particular  way in which the  the b's might  be
generated  under  a particular  proposal for indicator  targeting;  whether  or not regressions  (or
simple cross-category  income data)  based  on surveys or other  techniques  are used  is not a
central  issue.  In practice,  what  is central  is that  the "indicator"  used be (relatively)  perma-
nent  and not depend  on observing current income status.  Were temporary  characteristics-in
our model, employment  status-observable  and  hence "targetable",  we would have a  target-
ing technology  with four 6s, two for each of the poor and  the middle  class.  In a loose sense,
the setup  we use captures  the permanent-income  characteristics  aspect  of most  (developing
country)  targeting  proposals,  e.g.  using  gender,  ethnicity,  disability,  or other  "long-term"
characteristics  to target  recipients.
We summarize  the model's  structure  in Table  1. For each of the  three  groups  of agents,
the  table  shows their  maximal  marginal  products,  their  tax  status,  their  probablity  of a
"bad  shock,"  and  their  targeting  probabilities.
less  than pre-transfer median (expected)  income.  However, when everyone works at  her maximum  marginal
product,  pre-transfer mean income actually is greater, since it is defined as y + ugq.  Moreover, pre-transfer
median  income  will depend on  the population  proportions (the  e,)  and the  probability  of unemployment;
while it is possible for this median to be less than p, unless p is very large it will be any number m  E  (,.  1).
'40f  course,  in this  context  "efficiency"  means that  the  benefits  to the  winners  outweigh  the  costs  to the
losers,  of whom some will always exist:  with  6a or 
6
m, less than  unity,  targeted  transfers  are  not  provided  to
some poor  and  middle  class  agents  who need  them.
8Table  1: Structure  of the model
Type  of agent
Poor  Middle  Rich
Population  share  al  am  a,
Income  if
employed  L  I  r
Probability  of
"unemployment"  p  p  0
Can  Diversify  No  No  Yes
Tax Rate  0  T  r
Universal  transfer  N  N  N
Probability of  6E  l  m  0
receiving  targeted
transfer  = 6
Utility  function  Von  nNeumann  Morgenstern  utility  function  u:
u' > 0, u"  < 0.
2.3  Budget  Balance  and  Incentive  Constraints
Budget  balance  requires  that  N  +  60  =  yr.  Defining k  as the  proportion  of the  budget
spent  on  targeted  transfers,  budget  balance is expressed  by the  two identities
N  (1 - k)yr(1)
The  efficiency gain  from targeting  is directly  attributable  to  the T in the  denominator
of the  first  identity:  a  dollar  spent  on  targeted  transfers  allows  recipients  to  receive  1/6
dollars,  while a  dollar  spent  on  untargeted  transfers  gives only  one  doUar in  transfers  to
everyone  in the economy.
It  will be convenient  to define y  (1 - T)/6 and -yi similarly for each group  i.  We note
that  N  +  = ( 1  + Tk)yr,  and  hence O(N + 0)/Ok  =  Tyyr  and  cl(N  + 6)/Or  =  (I + Tk)y.
All agents  have  von Neummann-Morgenstern  preferences  with  the  twice  continuously
differentiable  state-contingent  utility  function  u, u' > 0, u"  < 0.15
Indexing  employment  status  by  h  =  1 if an  agent  is employed  and  h  = 0 if not,  and
indexing  receipt  of the  targeted  transfer  by j  = 1 if B is received and  j  = 0 if not,  we can
define consumption  for type  i individuals  in state  hj  as yi  . Poor  agents'  possible  income
states  appear  in Table  2a.
For the middle  class and the  rich,  we need to  take account  of job choice in determining
state  contingent  post-transfer  income.  Hence we require  that  if, given the  tax  and  transfer
regime, an employed agent  could do better  by earning  a lower before-tax  income, that  agent
15Again, for our social choice results, we need not assume that the function  u is the same for all three
types of individuals; for our results on the (social) optimality  of positive levels of targeting, we would not
require  identical u functions,  but some restrictions  would be necessary.
9will do  so."6 Since everyone  always receives  N,  its  size is irrelevant  for incentive  compat-
ibility  concerns.  Moreover, the  fact that  targeted  transfers  are  conditioned  on  underlying
characteristics  rather  than  on observed  income  means  that  even  if, say, bm  <  6i, the  size
of 0 is of no  concern  to  middle  class agents  in their  decision over  which job  to  take  when
employed.  It is for this reason,  as Akerlof shows, that  a targeted  transfer  may  be desirable:
unlike  transfers  conditioned  on income level, fully lump-sum  targeted  transfers  do not  re-
ward  inefficient  behavior."7 As such,  for employed members  of the  middle  class,  the  only
factor  affecting which job to  take is the relative  size of their  income when employed,  1- -r,
and  the  income  they  would have  if they  were to  masquerade  as poor  agents,  which  is  A.
Hence we have  our first  incentive compatibility  constraint:
(IC)m  r  <  1 - A  (2)
Middle-income  agents'  state-contingent  incomes are described  in Table  2b.
Table  2a:  Poor  Agents'  Income  By Employment  and  Targeting  State
Unemployed (h = 0)  Employed  (h =  1)
Do not  receive  9  (j  = 0)  yOO  = N  YIO  = N +A
Receive 0  y,I  = N+O  Yll  N +  +
Table  2b:  Middle Class Agents'  Income by  Employment  and  Targeting  State
Unemployed (h = 0)  Employed  (h =  I)
Takes  Job  Paying  /i  Takes Job  Paying  1
Donotreceive6(j=0)  yo  =N  Ymo=N+  /  ypm=N+I-r
Receive 0  Yomo  = N + 0  yo  = N  +6+it  y  N+  +1-r
The associated  consumption  state  probabilities  for type  i individuals  are irh*;,  i.e.  vr  =
p6t, Troo  = p(l  - b6), etc.  Ilence  overall utility  for an  agent  of type  i,  i =  I,m,  is U,(k,T)  =
,h  ,i  7rhju(yhj), h,j  = 0, 1. To find the  incentive compatibility  constraint  for the rich,  we
first note  that  since r  >  1  and  people working in middle class jobs pay taxes  when employed,
rich agents  never will take  middle  income jobs.  Hence the  constraint  that  matters  for the
rich is the one  that  keeps  them  from taking  low income jobs.  Again,  neither  N  nor  6 can
affect  this  margin,  so the  constraint  is simply
(IC)T  r<  1 - (3)
r
It  is obvious  that  in  any  equilibrium  with  positive  levels of transfers,  (IC)r  must  be
satisfied, since if (IC),  is not satisfied, neither  is ([C)m,  and  hence the tax  base is zero.  We
will show below that  in both thie policymaker's optimal  solution with  no political constraints
and  the political equilibrium,  positive levels of transfers  will exist;  as such,  we require (IC),
"'t should be noted that this issue arises  only because the poor pay  no taxes, so that for the middle class
and the rich, taking untaxed p-jobs  is advantageous  if the tax rate is too high.
"'Hence  what we mean by targeting  is precisely  what Akerlof  meant, and not what Nichols  and Zeckhauser
(1982) mean.
10to  hold  throughout  the  rest  of this  paper.  Hence, rich agents'  post-transfer  income  is just
y'  =  r(1-  r)  + N,  and  their  utility  in all states  is u(yr).
Before  concluding  this  section,  we note  that  yhj  >  y  1-middle  class people  always  do
at least as well as poor people in the same employment-targeting state-and  yho, yO  ￿  <  yr
non-rich  people who do  not receive 0 never do better  than  rich people.
3  The  Policymaker's  Optimum  With  No  Political  Constraints
In  this  section,  we ignore  political  constraints  and  explore  the  characteristics  of the  op-
timal  tax  and  transfer  regime  when  the  policymaker  faces only  the  budget  and  incentive
constraints.  We will generalize  Akerlof's  first  result  directly:  optimality  requires  the  use
of some  targeting,  i.e.  k  >  0.  but  also  requires  that  targeted  agents  receive  a  greater
total  transfer  than  they  would in a  world where targeting  was impossible.  This  finding  is
interesting  not only because  our economy is more general  than  Akerlof's,  but  also because
we consider  a  narrow  set  of feasible policies.  Since Akerlof's  economy  has only  two  types
of agents  and  no  income  uncertainty,  his tax  and  transfer  system  can  be derived  from  ei-
ther  a  lump-sum  (once job choice is fixed) or  linear  tax  system.  In  adding  another  type
of agent  and  unemployment,  we force ourselves to  choose between  the  two approaches;  as
the  enumeration  in the previous  section makes clear, we choose the latter  approach.  Hence
our  verification  of Akerlof's  results  is not only an extension,  but  also  a broadening,  of the
circumstances  known  to foster  the efficiency of targeting  when political  constraints  do not
operate.
Since our economy has a continuum  of agents at each consumption  level, we are able to
define social  welfare over realized  consumption  states  (with  each consumption  state  occur-
ring  in the  same  frequency  as its population-proportion  weighted  probability).  Assuming
that  the policymaker's  goal is to maximize some appropriately  weighted, nondecreasing  and
concave  evaluation  function  G, the policymaker's  objective  function  is
S(k,r)  - a5lEr'  G(u(yl  ))  + amZE1r'G(u(y'%))  +  arG(u(yr)),  (4)
h  j  h  j
and  her  problem  when  facing no political  constraints  is to
max{k,,)S(k,r)  subject  to budget  balance(l)and  incentive  compatibility(3).  (5)
We may  now state  our first  result  in Theorem  1: when enough  poor people  receive the
targeted  transfer,  the politically  unconstrained  optimal  policy necessarily involves a positive
level of targeted  transfers.
Theorem  1 (Some  targeting  is optimal  with  no  political  constraints)  Suppose  that
6g > 6 and G  is differentiable.  Then  any (k*,  r)  solving  A) will have k*  >  0.
Proof:  It  is sufficient  to show that  for any  tax  rate,  social welfare  is increasing  in k when
k  = 0 (i.e.  that  8(O,r)  > OVr).  We first  show that  this  condition  is satisfied  when  G  is
11the identity function, i.e. the policymaker maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function.
Note that  when k  =  0 income is independent of targeting status  for each income group,
Y  =  Yhl  for aUl  i. Also note that when k = 0 the income of the poor and the middle class
when unemployed is just  the universal transfer,  yI  =  = yT  =  N.  Substituting  in those
equalities and differentiating, we have in the utilitarian case
as  (O,r)  =  pyru'(N)[l  - - (1-  ar  - a)]
+  qyrolu (lj)(  -1)  + amU,(Ylj)(6n-I)]-ar-yrul(yr) +  oy-r[alu,(YI)  +  7t'Y')T-  )3  7yU(T
Dividing through by yir, this expression can be rewritten as
pa,[u(N)  - u'(y )]  + q{  (61  - )[u-(yl  U(YJ)]  + Ur  [u'(Y') - u'(Y3)]}  (6)
Since  N < y', yl  < yl7,  ym  < yr, and u" < 0, all bracketed  terms involving  differences
in u'(.) quantities  are positive;  hence,  61  >  i is sufficient  for the entire term to be positive  in
the utilitarian case. If G is not the identity  function,  then each u'(.) term is multiplied  by
an associated  term G'(u(.)). Since  G is concave,  this operation  only increases  the relative
differences  in the u'(.) terms.
Q.E.D.
The condition  6b  2 T is sufficient,  but clearly  stronger  than necessary,  since the other
terms in ( 6) are strictly positive. Moreover,  this condition  is very reasonable,  since with
, -0,  the condition  may  be rewritten  as
i > n  + v  im,  (7)
am  + a~r
from which  it is clear that the condition  simply  requires  that 61  not be too much less  than
6,m,  whereas  typically  we would  expect poverty-oriented  proposals  for targeting programs
to have 6 b  > am: poor people  should  be more  likely  than middle  class people to receive
targeted transfers.
One  obvious  result of Theorem  1 is that targeted  people  of a given  income  type receive
greater post-transfer  income  than do untargeted  people  of the same  type. For  our purposes,
this finding  is the important half of Akerlof's  result. 18 We now turn to the social choice
context.
"'li addition, Akerlof  demonstrated  that so long  as higher  income  agents'  (IC) constraiat  is satisfied  when
the tax level  is zero,  whea targeting  is possible,  recipients  of the  targeted  transfer  have  greater  post-transfer
income  than they would  under the optimal  policy  when  targeting  is not possible  (i.e. when  k is constrained
to be zero). [i  our terminology,  Akerlof  proved  that  I k>0  >  yh;4A,,o,  where  asterisks  denote optimality.
While we have been able to derive restrictions on our model's non-preference  paramneters  under which this
result holds  here  as well,  they are not particularly  intuitive. Moreover,  without  placing  restrictions  (beyond
concavity and monotonicity) on the form of the utility function, the conditions under which the result holds
are not very broad either.  Since the result is not our main focus, we forgo a detailed statement  of these
conditions.
124  Targeting  and  Social  Choice
In this  section  we take  a classical social choice approach  and  prove  two basic  results.  The
first  establishes  conditions  under  which  there  can  be  no  equilibrium  with  positive  levels
of targeting,  so that  the  only possible equilibrium  entails  no  targeting.  The second  result
establishes  conditions  under  which an equilibrium  with  no targeting  does exist.  We stress
again  that  even  with  no  targeting,  there  will be redistributive  universal  transfers.  After
introducing  some  useful  notation  in  the  first  subsection,  we  prove  the  theorems  in  the
second.
4.1  Social  Choice  Framework
In an  election  between  two  proposed  points,  we will say  that  one  beats  another  if it  has
voting  support  of more  than  half the  population.  Since the  groups  are  continua,  within
which all agents  are identical  (and  hence will vote identically),  we may  think  of the  model
in terms of three  representative  agents,  each having  total  voting strength  vi, with  E,  vi =  l.
We do not impose any relationship  between a group's  population  size and its voting strength.
As such,  we may  consider societies  where, for example,  a large  majority  of people  are poor
but  form  a relatively  insignificant  political  force, a situation  common  to many  developing
nations.  However, we do  assume  that  no  group  is decisive,  i.e.  that  vi  <  1/2 V i;  this
assumption  is necessary  for there  to  be a  political  economy issue  at  all.  Once it  is made,
however,  it is obvious  that  any  combination  of two groups  forms  a  majority  coalition,  so
that  our  social  choice  analysis  may  be  conducted  in  a  traditional  three-person  majority
voting framework.
For our  purposes,  the fundamental  result  in such a setting  is Plott's  (1968) theorem  on
the  existence  of interior  majority  voting equilibrium.  In the  present  context,  Plott's  two
substantive  conditions  are that  at  any equilibrium  point  (k,r)  > 0,
1) Members of one of the three groups must have maximal utility  (for a local equilibrium,
we require only  that  utility  be maximal  locally)  and
2) The other  two groups'  marginal  rates of substitution  between  k and  T must  be equal.
We verify in  the  next  subsection  that  these  two conditions  are mutually  exclusive  for
interior  points.  Ilowever,  a  fact  that  seems  to  have  been overlooked  in  the  social  choice
literature  is that  for non-interior  points,  e.g. points  of the form (0, r),  the second condition
is considerably  weaker.  So long as the two non-maximizing  groups  do not  have their  indif-
ference curves  intersect  except  at  the  interior  point,  existence  of equilibrium  is consistent
with  unequal  marginal  rates  of substitution,  if the  inequality  is in the  right  direction.  In
subsection  4.3 we offer intuitive  conditions  under  which such an equilibrium  will exist.
We now introduce  some terminology  that  will be useful in our consideration  of targeting
in a social choice context.  First,  we denote  the entire  feasible set of tax  rates  and  targeting
proportions,  [0, 1]  x [0, 1], as F.  At times it will be easier to carry  out our analysis  if we can
confine our attention  to the set of values of r for which both  (IC)  constraints  are satisfied.19
l9Since when r just exceeds I - i,  employed  mliddle  income people  switch into low-income  jobs, so
that there is a discrete  change  in everyone's  after-tax,  after-transfer  income;  this complication  means that
indifference  maps, which  we  describe  below,  will  not be continuous  ay 1  - p.
13Thus we define the set of points for which both (IC)  constraints are satisfied as
(1)  =_  {(k,r):  k  E [O,l|andr  <  I-j}
We then define
Bi(k,#)  _{(k,r):  U,(k,r)  >  Ui(k,?)}
Li(k,;)  _  {(k,r):  U,(k,r)  = U,(&,r)
Respectively, these sets are group i agents' better-than  and level sets. 20
Now define the win set of any given point (k, ;)  as the set of all points that  is preferred
to the point by at least two groups.
W(k,r)  = {((k,r):  (k,T)  E  (Bi(k, ,)  n Bi(k,*))  for  some  i ¢  j}
We define the set of voting equilibria over some set X  C_  as points that  cannot  be
beaten by any other points, that is, with empty winsets
E(X)  {(k,r):  W(k,r)  n X  = 0}
We will define a local equilibrium in X C Y as any point (k, r)  E E(O n X) for some
open ball 0  around (k, r).  When we want to consider the whole set of feasible (k,r),  i.e.
[0, 11  x [0, 1], we will  simply write E for the associated equilibrium set.  With this notation in
hand, we begin our consideration of social choice issues by addressing the political viability
of positive levels of targeted  transfers when all of Y, i.e.  the entire  set (0, 1i x (0,1], is
admissible.
4.2  Targeting  Cannot  Exist  in  a  Voting  Equilibrium
21Since the poor do not  pay taxes and  do receive transfers, it  must  always be the case
that  DUIlOr > 0, which implies that  poor agents always prefer a tax rate of unity to any
3OWe  note that  B.  and L.  define  transitive  partial  orderiap  for eachl  group  i, with  their  union  defining  a
complete  transitive  ordering.  Using the  standard  terminology,  we have
(k,r)  E B,(k,t)  *  (k,r)P,(k,r)
(k, r)  E  L(k  ;)  *  (k, r)l,(lk  ;)
(k,r)  E (B,uL,)(k,t)  *  (k,r)R,(k,;),
where  P.,  1. and  R.  have  their  standard  choice-theoretic  meanings.
"In  this subsection,  we will  assume  that  p = O, i.e.  tiat  the poor  have zero  marginal  product.  While obvi-
ously  unrealistic,  this assumption  is made solely  for ease of matlematical  exposition.  Given our  assumption
that  poor  agents'  marginal  product  is zero,  F(p)  =  r(O) _  . Quite  obviously,  under  this  assumption  both
(IC)  constraints  are satisfied  trivially,  so we have y  o,r + ve,.  AlU  qualitative  results  iik this  section  are
extended  to  tile general  case p  >  0 in  Appendix  2, while non-intuitive  or  tedious  proofs  of results  derived
in this  section  are relegated  to Appendix  1.
14other  feasible  value.  Similarly, the rich always pay  taxes,  and  since  we have  assumed  that
r  >  I  > y,  the  rich always  pay  more in  taxes  than  they  receive  from  N.  Ilence  it  must
always  be the  case  that  OU,/0r  <  0,  whiich implies  that  the  rich  always  prefer  a  tax  of
zero.
We now offer a fundaiiiental  condition  on 6m  and  T and use it below to prove  Lemma  1,
which  establishes  that  when the condition  is satisfied,  middle  class agents  always  prefer no
targeting  (and  also  always  prefer any  constant-tax  reduction  in  targeting  at  any  level of
targeting).
C  1
<m  <  6
We note  that  this  condition  can be rewritten  as 6,..  <  a  -61,  so  that  it requires  that
a  smaller  proportion  of middle  class  tlkan of poor  people  receive  0.  We choose  to  write
the  condition  as in C  I because  in that  form it emphasizes  the  comparison  a given middle
class person,  who has measure  zero, makes between  hier own chances of receiving B and  the
overall  number  of people in the  population  receiving B. This  approach  is useful  since  the
basic  logic  of Lemma  I below  has  to  do  with  precisely  this  comparison,  rather  than  one
between  the poor and  middle class group probabilities  of receiving  B (it so happens  that  the
individual  and group  probabilities  are identical,  but  that  fact is irrelevant  to the  individual
agent's  assessment  of various (k, r)  points).
Lemma  1 (The  middle  class  prefers  less targeting  when  6,,  < 3) Suppose that C I
holds.  Then OU,10/Ok  < 0, with equality at k = 0 iff C I holds with equality.
Proof: The  truth  of the  Lemma could be demonstrated  algebraically  by  partial  differenti-
ation,  but  a  more intuitive  proof is possible.  First,  niote that  for 6, <  1, using  some of the
budget  to fund a targeted  transfer  increases group-i  agents'  uncertainty  about  their  income
(above  and  beyond  the  exogenous  uncertainity  attributable  to  unemployment).  Next,  re-
calling  from equation  ( I) that  B _  kyr/b,  the  expected  value (over targeting-receipt  states
of the  world) of income for an agent  in group  i (when employment  status  is fixed) is
i(y+  N  +)+  (I-  )(y'+N)  =  y'+N+69i
=  y'+N+ +4kYr
6i =  y' + yr(I  - k(l-=i))  (8)
where  y' is after-tax,  pre-transfer  income of agent  i.  Noting thiat I - 6jl6 > 0 by hypothesis
of strict  satisfaction  of C 1, the expected  value of incotmie  over targeting  states  is decreasing
in k.  lhence when  C I holds strictly,  targetiing adds unicertainty  to middle  class incomiie  and
does so  at  a  retura  that  is worse thlant  actuarially  fair.  Replaccitiemet  of  >  with  =  in  the
15appropriate  places  yields the  result  that  targeting  is actuarially  fair  for  the  middle  class
group when  C 1 holds  with  equality.  It  is a  well-known result  that  risk-averse  agents  will
reject  gambles  that  are not  better  than  actuarially  fair.  Hence we must  have OUi/ak < 0,
with  equality  at  k = 0 if C 1 holds  with equality;  but  this is the statement  of the  Lemma.
Q.E.D.
Thus  satisfaction  of C  1 implies that  the unique local-and  hence global-maximum  of U,r
occurs  at  (0, arg max,  Um(0,r)).  Moreover, the condition  implies  that  (k,;)  E Bm(k,f)  X*
k  < k.  Similarly,  since 6,  =  0 trivially  implies satisfaction  of the  analogue  of C  1 for the
rich, we see that  the  unique local (and  hence global) maximum  of U,(k,  r) occurs  at  (0, 0).
Combining  application  of Lemma  1 and  our  result  that  OU,/19ir  <  0, it must  be  true  that
(k, r)  E B7,(i, r)  if k  < k, T  <  r, or both.
The  level sets  Li(k,r)  will be  of fundamental  importance  in  our  analysis.  It  will be
convenient  to  refer  to them  in terms  of their  associated  indifference  maps  ri(k;  Ui), which
may  be defined  as that  level (or set of levels) of the  tax  rate  that  keeps  utility  constant  at
Ui when  the degree of targeting  is k.22
The  only one of these three  indifference maps that  we may describe  explicitly  (without
strong  assumptions  on u, Em, or 61  ) is r,.  Since rich voters face no uncertainty  over income,
their level sets are determined  by those variations  in k and  r  that  leave them  with  constant
consumption,  so that  for any level of consumption  c,,  we have
7r,(k;  u(cr))  -r  (1-  k)y  (9)
Figure  la  depicts  a typical  map r,  and  the better-than  set  B,  of any  point  lying on  it.
To continue,  if we know that  u(k,;)  = u(c,),  we can write
r,(k;  u(c,))  - (r  k)Y  (10)
r  -k)y
Unless strong  simplifying  assumptions  on  the  Es are made,  it is not  in general  possible
to give closed-form definitions of rl and rm.  IHowever,  as we show below, the primary  results
2 2Given  values U° of the voters'  utility  functions,  over some domain  K,(Ui)  of possible  values  of k, group
i's  level  set  will have an  associated  function  (for  the  poor  and  the  rich) or  correspondence  (for  the  middle
clas)  mapping  a valuc of k to values of r that  yield the same  utility  to members  of that  group  as does  (k, r )
The  poor  and  the  rich  have functions  because  their  utility  functions  are  strictly  increasing  (the  poor)  or
strictly  decreasing  (the  rich) in r, so that  no value of k can  be mapped  to more than  one value of r  yielding
the  same  level of utility.  The  middle  class  have an  indifference  correspondence  because  for any  value  of k,
there  may  be  zero, one,  or two values of r  yielding  a given level of utility.  (The  possibility  of zero is trivial,
and  by strict  concavity  of Urn in r,  we know that  there  cannot  be  more  than  two values.  There  will be one
value if either  that  value is a maximum  (conditional  on k)  or a non-feasible  tax  (i.e.  greater  than  I or  less
than  zero)  were  necessary  to  achieve  the  given  level of utility.)  That  said,  we  have  r:  K1(U)  - [0,1],
r,  Kr(U,°)  - [0, 1], and  r.:  Khm(Um,)  =>  (0,  1] ,  where
K. (Uio)  {k  3rs.  t. U,(k,r)  =  U°O
16we will need  for  Tl  may  be gotten  with  the aid of the implicit  function  theorem.  Moreover,
the  only  qualitative  result  we will need  regarding  middle  class  agents'  preferences  is the
previous  lemma's,  namely that  when C 1 holds, middle  class people will vote  for constant-
tax  reductions  in k  at  all  points.  All necessary intuition  regarding  rm may  be gotten  from
Figures  lb,  an example  when C 1 is satisfied,  and  lc,  in which it is not.
It  will be useful to  define a function  r*(k) which satisfies
r'(k)  =  argmax  Um(k,r)
T E [O,1]given I  =  0  (11)
This function  tells us the optimal  tax rate, from the point  of view of middle  class agents,
when  the  degree of targeting  is k.23 The function  is given implicitly  by  the equation
-m  = 0  (12)
Or
By the implicit  function  theorem,  for r  (k)  E (0, 1) we have
dr  i 2Um/..ksr  (13)
dk  a2Um/0r 2
Similarly,  we can  define a  function  k*(r),  which tells  us  middle  class  voters'  optimal
level of k when the tax rate is T:
k'(r)  =  arg  max  Um(k,t)  (14)
ke(o,1]given  p = 0
given by24
Um  ,,  (15)
Ok
and  whose first derivative,  when the assumptions  of the  IFT  are satisfied,  is given  by 25
dk_  d2Um/Ok,9r  (16)
dTr  2Um/0k 2
We can now prove another lemma.
Lemma  2 (Conditions  for the  middle  class  to  prefer  r <  1)  Suppose p  =  0.  Then
v  < q, i.e.  o,r  < q(l - om),  if and only if
(i) r(O)  <  I and
(ii)  At  any point  (k, 1),  either OU,/Or  < 0, OUm/0k  < 0, or  both.
23The opportunity  set [0,  1]  is compact  and our assumptions  on u imply  that U, is continuous  and concave
in r over  this set. Thus by the theorem  of the maximum,  r  exists and is continuous.
24of  course,  when  C I is satisfied,  we have  aUrn/ak  < 0, so that k(r)  = 0 and dk/dr  = 0.
25We note that by our assumption  that  u" <  0, the denominator  terms in both first derivatives  are
negative. Hence  each first  derivative  has the sign  of the cross  partial derivative  in its numerator.
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Conclusion  (i) of Lemma  2 evidently  implies that  when j. = 0, the  point  (0, 1) is never
a voting equilibrium,  since the optimal  tax  rate for both  rich and  middle  class voters  when
k = 0 is less than  unity.  For technical  reasons,  conclusion  (ii) is useful  below in ruling  out
the possibility  of positive  levels of B in equilibrium  (when j. = 0).
Next,  we use  Condition  C  2 to  establish  in  Lemma  3  an  instrumental  single-crossing
property  between  ri and  Tr.  This property  will rule points  (k,r)  E (0,1)  x (0,1),  i.e.  points
in the  interior  of X, out of the  equilibrium  set.
C  2
,>1-  r
Lemma  3  (Single  Crossing  for  rr & TI)  If  C 2 is satisfied,  then
(i) Any  two indifference  curves rT(k;  U 1)  and Tr(k;  c,)  intersect  at most  once.
(ii)  If Tli(k)  =  rr(k),  then rj(k) <  (>)Tr(k)Vk  < (>)k.
For k  = 0, (i)  and (ii)  hold only if C  2 is satisfied.
Proof.  See Appendix  1.
Figure  Id  depicts  a  typical  example  a  poor  agent's  indifference  map  Ti.  The  single
crossing result  established  in the  previous lemma is depicted  in Figure  2a.  When the  result
holds,  any  possible rich-poor  coalitions  to defeat  a point  are limited  to points  having  lower
values of k than  the  point  in question.  lIence b is beatable,  but  a is not,  since it lies on the
vertical  axis,  and  negative  values of k are not  permitted.  Figure  2b  shows what  happens
when  C  2 is  violated:  any  point  on  the  vertical  axis  is locally  beatable  by  a  rich-poor
coalition  in favor of points  like those in B 1 n Br.
As  for coalitions  involving the  middle class,  Figure  2c shows an example  in  which  the
middle  class and  the  rich may  form a successful coalition.  In fact,  Lemma  1 tells  us that
so long as 
6 m  < 6, such coalitions  always are possible at  interior  points  (such  as a).  Figure
2d  depicts  two possible  situations  regarding  poor-middle  class coalitions.  The  point  a is
beatable  by any point  in the region I (which includes that  part  of the  vertical  axis adjacent
to it),  while the  point  b cannot  be beaten  by a poor-middle  class coalition.
With  these  graphs  and  Plott's  conditions  in mind, any interior  majority  voting equilib-
rium  must  resemble  the  situation  shown in Figure  3.  The  point  m'  is optimal  for middle
class voters  (we include  the  locus of points  rm only to  remind  readers  what  middle  class
voters  indifference  curves  must  look like in this  case;  for any  point  on  this  locus,  the  ar-
rows indicate  the  direction  of improvement  for middle  class  voters).  At  the  same  time,
the  better-than  sets  for rich and  poor agents  have to be disjoint,  which implies  that  their
indifference  curves  are  tangent,  i.e.  that  rich and  poor  voters  have  equal  marginal  rates
of substitution  at  7n'.  Hence interior  equilibrium  requires  the  simultaneous  violation  of
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%[W!til  9  sres31'''/conditions  C I and  C 2.  Lemma 4 shows that  this  situation  cannot  happen.  In the  theorem
that  follows, we bring  together  this  lemma  and  the  ones preceding  it  to show that  the  set
of interior  equilibria  is empty.
Lemma  4  At  least one  of C  1 or C 2 is satisfied.
Proof: Appendix  1.
Theorem  2  (Targeting  cannot  exist  in  equilibrium  (Plott,  1968))  Suppose  A = 0.
For any  set  X  C  F  satisfying  int(X)  $ 0 and  any point  (k, T)  E int(X),  W(k,  T)  is locally
nonempty.  (Equivalently,  E(O n X)  = 0 for  all open balls 0  of (k, r)  and (k, r)  E int(X).)
Proof: We begin by demonstrating  the result  for F.  By Lemma 4, no point (k, r),  k  > 0, can
satisfy  both  of Plott's  conditions,  since either  the  middle class and  rich can form a coalition
in favor of a constant-tax  local reduction  of k or the  rich and  poor  can form a coalition  to
reduce  k locally  while increasing r locally.  This establishes  the  result  for X  F.  But  since
the coalitions  just  described  favor points  that  are arbitrarily  close to (k,r),  the  result  must
carry  over to  any  arbitrary  X  C F.
Q.E.D.
This  result  is obviously  negative  from  the  point  of view of supporting  targeting,  but
by itself it is hardly  sufficient to ruin  the  case for targeting.  An enormous  and  well-known
literature  has established  that  social choice models do not in general  have voting equilibria,
so it might  be the  case that  an equally  negative  result  holds for any  non-targeting  (k  = 0)
regime.  That  is, it  might  be  the  case  that  while positive  levels of targeting  always  are
beatable,  there  always exists  a positive  level of targeting  that  can  beat  any  non-targeting
regime.  This  possibility  is exactly  what  we rule out  in the  next  subsection.
4.3  Equilibrium  Exists  With  No  Targeting
We now prove  Theorem  3, which gives necessary and  sufficient conditions  for the existence
of majority  voting  equilibrium  with  no  targeting  (we stress  again  that  positive  iransfers
will occur  in such an equilibrium).
Theorem  3  (Equilibria  exist  with  no  targeting.)  Suppose  bl  >  am.  Then  both C  1
and C  2 are satisfied  if and only  if E(F)  = {(O,  r*(O))}
Proof  See Appendix  1.
We point  out  that  the  results  given so far  imply  that,  while an  equilbrium  need  not
exist,  if one  does it can occur  only in a  non-targeting  regime.  HIence  even  if one  wishes to
dispute  the assumptions  used in Theorem  3, one still must  face the  fact that  no other  point
in the  space may  be supported  as an equilibrium.
Aside from noting  that  we have put  j  = 0 (an assumption  we deal with in Appendix  2),
two basic  attacks  on  this  theorem's  assumptions  are possible.  First,  one  might  argue  that
19t§}7w  j  t;  1tB, 
4-,\we should  not assume 61 >  6m.  We are perfectly willing to entertain  the idea that  when this
assumption  is violated-which  implies that  6m  >  a-targeting  might  be a good  idea  from a
political  point  of view: our aim in this  paper  is to argue  that  targeting  is politically  viable
only when the  benefits  of targeting  are dispersed  over a large  enough  group  of people.  But
a  targeting  regime  in  which  the  middle  class are  more  likely  than  the  poor  to  receive  a
transfer  is not what  most  people have in mind  when they  propose  to  target  transfers.
Second,  one  might  argue  that  the  requirement  in  condition  C  2  that  6, and  6m  be
sufficiently  close is overly restrictive.  In response,  we note  first  that  while the  condition  is
always sufficient,  it is necessary  only at  k = 0.  Moreover, while we admit  being  less than
satisfied  with  the  condition,  it  does  have  an  intuitive  explanation.  When  61 is large  by
comparison  to  6m,  it also must  be large relative  to 3, so that  the  poor  gain  a large  amount
from targeting  relative  to taxation;  that  is, they are more willing to agree to  tax  reductions
in return  for increased  targeting.  The rich, on  the other  hand,  will be more willing to agree
to such deals  when  their  taxable  income is large  relative  to the  transfers  they  receive, i.e.
N.  Recalling  that  the  income of the  rich always is r(l  - r)  + N,  it  makes  sense  that  as
r  increases,  so that  the  rich care relatively  more about  the  taxes  they  pay  than  about  the
transfers  they  receive, they  will be more willing to  accept  more  targeting  in exchange  for
lower  taxes.  Ilence  this  attack  on  Theorem  3 relies  on  the  claim  that  the  rich  and  the
poor  are  likely to  agree on  proposals  to cut  taxes  in return  for  more  targeting.  Whether
or not  this  phenomenon  generally  occurs  in the  real  world is an  empirical  question  worth
answering,  but  rarely (if ever) considered in existing empirical  work.  As a practical  matter,
however,  the  requirement  that  bi be  sufficiently  larger  than  6m  requires  relatively  high
performance  from  the  indicators  used to develop  the  criterion  function  that  is to identify
the  poor,  and  most  existing  empirical  work does not  suggest  such performance  is possible.
5  A  Nash  Equilibrium  Approach
5.1  Introduction
Our second approach  to modelling the politics of tagging is to assume that  elections are held
to determine  the level of taxation,  given the policymaker's  choice of the level of targeting.
This  approach  allows  us  to  assess  the  applicability  of the  targeting  asessment  literature,
where authors  typically  assume  what  we will call the  "naive policymaker".  That  is, these
authors  ask  the  question,  "For  a fixed  budget,  what  kind  of targeting  regime,  based  on
observable  indicators,  minimizes the level of a poverty  index?" 2 6
The  Glewwe (1990)  example  cited  in our  introduction  is an excellent  example  of this
approach.  Hle calculates  that  with a  fixed budget  of 10 million  CFA francs,  a uniform  per
capita  transfer  in  Cote  d'lvoire  could  reduce  poverty  by six  percent.  By  contrast,  using
estimates  of the  relationship  between  income and  household  characteristics  to  implement
indicator  targeting,  that  same  10 million francs  could reduce  poverty  by  more  than  three
times  as much-19  percent.  Yet, all transfers  go to  East  Forest  residents.  Numerous  other
examples  of roughly  the  same  approach  may  be found,  with  a  variety  of indicators  used.
2'Typically, a Foster,  Greer,  Thorbecke  (1984) index is used, with poverty  lines determined  using one of
the methods proposed by Ravallion  (1994).
20Baker  and  Grosh  (1994) examine  the  implications  of geographic  targeting  in  Jamaica  and
find that  allocating  a poverty budget  of 10 percent  of the poverty line to five (of 14) parishes
would reduce  poverty  nearly  twice as much as a nationwide  transfer.  Ravallion  and  Chao
(1989)  use  data  on  differences in  household  income  across six  regions  of Java,  Indonesia,
to show that  the  optimally  targeted  budget  of 114 million  rupiahs  would  direct  the  entire
poverty  alleviation  budget  to  rural  residents  of East  Java.  More  strikingly,  if one  allows
taxation  of residents  in one region to finance transfers  to those in another,  residents  of East
Java  should receive 1,963 Rupiahs per household,  while urban  residents of West  Java should
pay a head  tax  of 2,585 Rp.  27
Use of this  general  approach  is not  confined to journal  articles.  In the  present  inter-
national  development  climate,  which features  both  enhanced  efforts to  reduce  poverty  and
(at  least  perceived)  tighter  fiscal constraints,  targeting  is very  much  on  economic  advis-
ers'  agenda.  A  recent  treatment  of public  spending  and  the  poor  states  that  "the  most
commonly  heard  proposal  for achieving  a more  pro-poor  benefit  distribution  is 'improved
targeting'."  (van de Walle [1995]). A primary  aim of household  income surveys  in  LDCs is
to construct  poverty  profiles which are to be used to target  resources  more effectively.  One
recent  World Bank report  states  that  "probably  the most important  use of the poverty  pro-
file is to support  efforts  to target  development  expenditures  towards  poorer  areas,  aiming
to reduce  aggregate  poverty."  Policy discussions  and  most of the  articles  cited  above alike
mention  political  issues in passing,  but  these are not  taken  into account  explicitly.
5.2  Solving  the  wrong  problem  is  not  right
We consider  two  versions of the  elections  approach,  in  each case  using  the  median  voter
theorem  to  pin down the  level of taxation  at  ir(k).  In the first  version,  which  reflects the
methodology  of the  targeting  assessment  literature  discussed above,  the policymaker  takes
the level of taxation  as given, while in the second version the policymaker  takes the  function
r-(k)  as given.  That  is, in the second version the policymaker  recognizes  that  her choice of
k  wiU affect  the level of taxation  in political  equilibrium.
We establish  a series of results.  First,  we show that  choosing  the degree of targeting  to
maximize  a SWF28 subject  to a fixed budget  constraint  is an ill-posed problem,  in the sense
that  it almost  never  produces  a  'true"  optimum.  That  is, the  budget  is not in fact  fixed,
so  that  treating  it  as such  involves misspecifying  the  opportunity  set.  Second,  we offer
conditions  under  which  the  median  voter's  optimal  tax  function  r*(k)  is  monotonically
decreasing  in  the  degree of targeting.  Third,  we show in  the  second  version  that  under
broader  conditions,  r'  is decreasing  at  k  = 0, so  that  depending  on  the  SWF  of choice, it
often  will be possible  that  zero targeting  is a (local29)  Nash equilibrium.
Recalling  the  social  welfare function  S and  its  associated  evaluation  function  G  intro-
duced in Section  3, we can write the policymaker's  problem in Versions I and II, respectively,
as:
27Recall  Akerlof's  result  that  having  some  low-skill workers  pay  taxes  to fund  transfers  to  other  similar
workers  cannot  in general  be ruled  out  of the set  of optimal  policies.
2"Recall  that  minimizing  a poverty  index  of the  FGT  form is a special  case of this  procedure.
"9We define  our  concept  of local  Nash  equilibrium  below
21max  S(k,r)  given r  (17)
kE[0,1]
max  S(k,r)such  thatr  = r*(k)  =:  max  S(k,T*(k))  (18)
kE[0,11  E01
Thus  in  Version  1, Nash  equilibrium  requires  both  that  r  =  r'(k)  and  that  k solve
( 17),  while in  Version  II, it  is taken  as given  (by  the  policymaker)  that  r  =  r*(k),  so
Nash  equilibrium  is achieved by  any k solving (  18). Our first  result,  given in  Theorem  4,
demonstrates  that  Nash equilibria  exist  in both  versions of the  Nash  approach.
Theorem  4  (Existence  of  Nash  Equilibrium)  In  both  Version  I  and  Version  11, at
least  one Nash  equilibrium  ezists.
Proof:  In both  of Problems  17 and  18, S is continuous  by our  assumption  that  G  is, r-  is
continuous  by the theorem  of the maximum,  and the set [0,11 is compact.  Hence an optimal
value  of k for  the policymaker  exists,  establishing  proof for  Version II.  In Version  I, since
S also is concave in k, the  optimal  value is unique;  in this  case, we have a functional  rela-
tionship  k =  4S(r)  if k solves ( 17), where 4 is continuous  by the  theorem  of the maximum.
As we describe  in the  text,  the  equilibrium  set consists  of all  points  (k,r)  =  (,(r),r-(k)),
suggesting  we define a function  n:  F -*  F such that  n(k, r)  =  (X(r), r-(k));  note  that  n is
continuous  and  F  is convex.  By Brouwer's  Fixed  Point  Theorem,  n has  at  least  one fixed
point,  proving  that  a Nash equilibrium  exists in Version I.
Q.E.D.
Assuming  that  G-and  hence  S-is differentiable  30, we can use  the usual  first order  con-
ditions  to establish  necessary  conditions  for Nash equilibrium.  In Version  I, each objective
function  is  strictly  concave  in  its  choice variable,  so  (interior)  Nash  equilibria  are  fully
described  by 31
r  =  T(k),  Sk =.  (19)
As the  discussion in the introductory  part of this section details,  this situation  conforms
to what  proponents  of indicator  targeting  have in mind.  However, our approach  in Version
II  suggests  that  more  careful  analysis  is in  order.  So  long  as  r*(k)  E  (0, 1),  i.e.  the
middle  class's problem  always has an interior  solution, our  assumptions  on u imply, via the
30Some evaluation  functions  are only piecewise  differentiable;  one example  is the  Foster-Greer-Thorbecke
poverty  index  mentioned  earlier.  These  functions  are more  tedious  to work  with,  since  one  must  take  into
account  the possibility  (perhaps  even the  likelihood)  that  optima  occur  at  kink  points.  However,  the  usual
approach,  i.e.  checking  all kink points  for optimality  conditions,  solves the  problem;  as there  is no gain  in
intuition  from  treating  such functions  explicitly,  we leave the reader  to make  the  necessary  modifications  to
the  argument  in the  text.
3'For  boundary  solutions,  we would  replace  = with  < (for k  =  0) or  >  (for k =  1).  Of course,  Theorem  I
demonstrates  that  at  k =  0 we have Si  > 0.
22implicit function theorem, that  r* is everywhere differentiable. Hence we can take a first-
order approach to ( 18), so that  the necessary condition for (an interior) Nash equilibrium
of Version II is32
Sk  + ST  dT  =  °  (20)
dk
Except for points where either S, or dr*/dk equals zero, optima will not be characterized
by Sk = 0.  This fact of course begs the question, Will ST or dr-/dk  equal zero?  Before
answering, we demonstrate in the following  theorem that  from the policymaker's point of
view, any Version 11 equilibrium weakly dominates all Version I equilibria.  The logic of
the theorem is nearly trivial:  if one misspecifies  one's constraint  set and  then solves the
associated misspecified  optimization problem, but the constraint must bind in equilibrium,
one can hardly expect to outperform an optimal choice made over the correctly specified
constraint set.  The "weak" part of the theorem is necessary because it is of course possible
that  the misspecified  constraint set contains the optimal choice from the correctly specified
one. However,  after stating the theorem, we shall argue for the unlikeliness  of this particular
outcome in the present context.
Theorem  5 (Assuming  a  fixed  budget  is (almost)  never  optimal)  Suppose G is dif-
ferentiable.  Let 4  be the parameter space with vector elements 4' satisfying the basic re-
strictions of the model. Let
VI(O) = {k:  k solves ( 17) when the parameters of the model are specified as 4d>
and define VII(*)  analogously. Then for any K E VII(*)  and r.' E  VI(4'),  S(Kc,Tr(Kc))  >
S(KC', r*(x')).
Proof:  Suppose that  K
1 solves (17);  then by definition Sk(oc',  r(Wc))  =  0; note that  by
Theorem 1, ic' > 0. Hence from ( 18) we have
dS  I('~K  d)~Kr*  KI  (1 Jk=S,(c'r.  ('  dk (Wc,r'(Wc))  (21)
So long as neither term on the RHS of Equation 21 is  zero, it is obvious that  K
1 does
not solve ( 18), which is to say that  there is some other value r. in a neighborhood of /c'
such that  S(cr,T(K))  > S(C', e(o')),  If either RHS term is zero at  K
1, this inequality need
not hold (it need not be violated either, since it is possible that  K'  is a global maximum of
S over the Version I constraint set but only a local maximum over the Version II), but  K'
itself is always feasible in ( 18), so the policymaker  never does worse by solving the Version
II problem.
Q.E.D.
32A  above,  we note  that  boundary solutions would involve the  replacement  of =  with < (for k  = 0) or >
(for k =  1)2
23Figure 4a  should provide the necessary intuition.  The  curves labeled  SW  are iso-
social welfare loci, whose slopes are -Sk/Sr.  At point A, or (ko,ro) the curve SW0 has
a minimum, so Sk  =  0; also, r*(kO) =  ro.  Hence A is a Nash equilibrium of Version I.
However,  dr*/dk  > 0 at A, so that an improvement of social welfare is feasible by moving,
for example, to point B: Version  I leads to an undertargeted equilibrium in this case. This
outcome occurs because when the policymaker takes to  as given, she ignores the entire
region R, all of which is feasible and some of which allows welfare improvement over A.
Figure 4b shows an example where the equilibria of our two games are equivalent from
the policymaker's perspective.  It should be obvious that  the possibility of this event is
quite remote 33.
5.3  Is  the  "naive"  amount  of targeting  too  high  or  too  low?
Although Figure 4a showed an undertargeting example, we believe that  the  more likely
scenario is depicted in Figure 5. The difference  here is that at A', dr*fdk  < 0. In this case,
the policymaker fails to regard as feasible the region  R', all of which allows improvement. In
this case, the Nash equilibrium of Version II occurs at (0,r*(O)), where the policymaker is
on her highest politically  feasible iso-welfare  curve. At this point, the 'naive"  policymaker
of Version I believes the entire rectangle r*(O)  - 0 - I - r*(O) is feasible, so she turns down
the opportunity to select (O,r*(O)),  preferring  instead the point C, with the associated level
of targeting kl.  But at k1,  rs(O) is not selected by voters; rather,  they choose ri,  and so
on, until we reach the point A', where both Sk = 0 and r = r-(k).
Figure 5 suggests heuristically that  when the Version I equilibrium is worse than  the
Version II equilbrium, it can be a lot worse. This fact suggests that  we should examine in
detail the conditions under which our economy  looks like the one depicted in Figure 2. In
particular, we would like to characterize dr*/dk and the sign of S,, especially at k = 0.  We
wili find it convenient to restrict consideration to the case of constant relative risk aversion
utilities 34.
Unless we indicate otherwise, we assume throughout the remainder of this section that
C 1 is satisfied with strict inequality. We proceed by offering sufficient conditions under
which rT decreases monotonically. We then show that at k = 0 this sufficient condition is
far stronger than necessary.
Proposition  1  Suppose that we have CRRA  utilities with parameter p,  C I  is satisfied
strictly and p < 1. Then r  is monotonically  decreasing.
Proof: To begin, we recall from equation ( 13) that dr/dk  =  -(82 U./,kkr)/(8 2 U../Lgr 2).
Since O 2Umn/r 2 always is negative (by concavity of u),  dr*/dk  has  the same sign as
89 2Un/Mkor.  Dropping the m subscript of Um, partial  differentiation with respect to k
yields
33Algebraically, this  event  requires  that  there  is  a  point  (k, r)  where  simultaneously  MUm8tr =
8
2 UmU8kt9r  =  Sg. =  0.  There is no reason why all three of these conditions-which generally imply very
different qualitative restrictions on the model's parameters-should hold at once.
34When we say that  this  restriction is for convenience, we really mean it.  The main result we report  in
the  text below carries through without the CRRA assumption; we will use footnotes in the text  below to
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Differentiating  this  expression  partially  with respect  to r,  we have
UkT  =  -+  6m.Y{;I[p(N + 0)u"(N  + 0) + q(N  + 0 - r)u"(N  + 0 + I -r)
- 7 m[pNu"(N)  + q(N  + 1  - r)u"(N  + 1 -r)]},  (23)
which can  be rewritten  as
Uk 7 =
m.Y(I  - p){4[pu'(N  + 0) + qu'(N  + 0 +  I - ]-Ym[Pu'(N)  + qu'(N + 1 -r)]}
-q6mY[;Tu'(N  + 0 + 1 - r)  -tmu"(N  +  1 - r)]  (24)
Since u"  < 0 and  7y  <  ym (by C 1), the  term multiplied  by (1 - p) is negative.  The  rest
of the  RHS must  be negative,  since u"' > 0.  lience  p <  1 is a sufficient condition  for r'  to
be monotonically  decreasing.
Q.E.D.
That  rT should  be monotonically  decreasing  whenever the  degree  of risk aversion  does
not exceed that  exhibited  by log utilities  has an entirely  intuitive  explanation. 35 From  the
point  of view of middle  class  voters,  the  role served  by  taxation  is the  redistribution  of
income from the unemployed  state  of the world to the employed one.  When  C 1 is satisfied,
we know from Lemma  1 that  this  redistribution  becomes less efficient.36 Stated  in slightly
different  form,  as  k  rises,  the  price  of shifting  consumption  from  the  employed  state  to
the  unemployed  state  rises.  We therefore  know there  wiU be a  substitution  effect:  when  a
good's  price  rises,  people  have an incentive  to  shift some consumption  to other  goods.  In
the  present  case, "other  goods"  are employed-state  consumption,  so that  the  substitution
35We can  weaken  Proposition  l's  hypothesis  by dropping  the CRRA  assumption  and instead  substituting
the  assumptions  that  i.".  >  0, p be  nondecreasing,  and  p(l)  C  1. The  assumption  on  u."' ensures  negativity
of the  second  part  of  the  RHS of equation  ( 24).  As for the  first  term,  it  must  be  altered  by  multiplying
each  u'  term  by one  minus  its  associated  coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion  (e.g.  we  multiply  u'(N)  by
(I - p(Y)].  We require  p(l)  S  1 because  V <  q <  I gurantees  N  < r,  so that  N  < N + I - r  <  1.  Together
with  the  assumption  that  p is nondecreasing,  this  ensures  that  neither  term  multiplied  by  7ym  exceeds  its
associated  3  term,  It  is worth  noting  that  while the  degree  of risk  aversion  is uniquely  determined  (unlike
the  representation  of preferences  over consumption  levels, the  representation  of preferences  over risk  is not
altered  by  affine  transformations),  our  requirement  on  p(l)  might  seem  to  imply  that  when  u  does  not
satisfy  the  CRRA  form,  it  matters  which units  we use to measure  income.  Of course,  this  is backwards:  if
we multiply  all income  variables  by any positive  constant,  middle  class  voters'  first  order  condition  U,. =  0
is unaffected,  and  we end  up with  the  condition  that  p(m)  <  1, where m  is middle  class  voters'  maximum
marginal  product.  Hence  the restrictions  in this footnote  are qualitative  in  nature.
3"This  point  is  made  precise  by  observing  that  92Um/okar  =  i9(aUm/ar)/ak,  so  that  the  condition
a2Uml/9k49r <  0 implies  that  the  change  in utility  achieved  for a smal  increase  in the  tax  rate-OUm/a7r-is
decreasing  as  k  increases.  It  is  therefore  natural  to  think  of increases  in  k  as  reducing  the  efficiency  of
taxation  in redistributing  income  across  states  of the  world.
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ts}  ..o*1effect makes middle-class  agents  want to  reduce the  tax  rate.  Of course,  there  will also  be
an income  effect:  since any  given level of consumption  of a good  becomes  more  expensive
as that  good's  price rises, more income must be spent on that  good  to maintain  the present
level of consumption.  Thus  the  income effect makes middle-class  agents  want  to  increase
the  tax  rate.
Hence the  signing of dr'/dk  can be thought  of as the resolution  of the  standard  tension
between  the  substitution  and  income effects.  When p is unity,  we have  the  Cobb-Douglas
(log utilities)  case,  when  we know that  the  income  and  substitution  effects exactly  offset;
thus  we could hardly  expect  7` to be increasing in this  case.  While  it might  seem puzzling
that  p  =  1 is a  sufficient condition  for  r*  to  be decreasing,  since  we have just  noted  the
offsetting  influences of the  substitution  and  income effects in  the  Cobb-Douglas  case,  the
puzzle is solved when we recognize that  all prices change when k  changes.  That  is, changes
in k change the  relative  rate  of redistribution  of income across states  in a non-proportional
way,  so  that  more  than  one  set  of income  and  substitution  effects  must  be  taken  into
account.
It is reasonable  to believe that  people's  risk aversion exceeds that  described  by log util-
ities, and we admit  both  our  desire and our inability  to derive general  analytical  conditions
that  allow the  signing  of dr*/dk  in all  cases.  Ilowever,  it turns  out  that  the  log utilities
condition  is much stronger  than  is often  needed.  We demonstrate  this  fact  by  considering
the  case when  k =  0 and  showing that  under  broad  circumstances,  rT  may  be decreasing
there  even as p approaches  infinity. At  k = 0, we have 0 = 0 and  N  = yr,  so that  the  first
order  condition  is
p-yN-  =  q(l - y)(N+  l -)  (25)
We can solve this  equation  for the explict  value of r'(0):
I
r-(O)  P  where
7+ (1i - v  Ax
PY  =(26)
q(l  -y
It  is  easy  to  see  that  so long  as  y  <  q and  p  >  0,  we  have  A, T(O) E  (0,1).  It  is
also  clear  that  UmProo r  (O)  = 1 and  limP-o r-(O)  =  0.  These  facts  confirm  what  our
basic intuition  should  be:  with  no targeting,  the tax  rate  (and  hence  redistribution  across
employment  states)  should approach zero as people approach risk neutrality  and  unity as the
marginal  rate of substitution  of income between states  becomes infinitely  inelastic  (Leontief
preferences).  In the  special  case when p =  1, i.e.  log utilities,  we have r*(0)  =  p/(l  - y).
In general,  r(0)  is  increasing  in  r,a,m,  and  r  (since  the  transfer  "technology"  is more
efficient from  the  perspective  of any  given middle class voter  the greater  is the rich-income
part  of the  tax  base  and,  in general,  the  more other  people-including  other  middle  class
people-there  are to tax).  The general effect of p is indeterminate,  i.e.  it depends  on p, since
a higher probability  of unemployment  for all middle class people  both  increases  their  need
26for  transfers  and  decreases  the  tax  base,  making  inter-employment  state  transfers  more
expensive  for  the middle  class37.
Next, recalling  that  dir/dk  has the same sign as 02Um/OkTr,  we take  this  cross-partial
derivative  and  divide it by tmY,  yielding
(Y -m)I[pu'(N)(l  - p) + qu'(N  + 1 - r)(1  - p) - qu"(N + 1 -)]
The  term  in parentheses  has the  same  sign as  bm - 6, which  we have  assumed  to  be
negative.  Noting  that  u"(c)  =  -pu'(c)/c  and  that  our  first  order  condition  for  r*(O) was
pyu'(N)  = q(l  - y)u'(N  + 1 - r),  the  term  in brackets  will be positive  if and  only if
p <  I +  -yj  + p  N  (27)
Using Equation  ( 26) it can  be shown  that  (r  - N)/(l  - (r  - N))  = A1/P(1 - Y)/Y, so
we can rearrange  ( 27) to  read
1  +  . p  <  - +  PAP
or
p(l  - AP) <  l  _(28)
The  right  hand  side of (  28)  is strictly  greater  than  unity,  and  the  left  hand  side  is
strictly  less than  p, leaving a good deal of slack (as  theory goes)  for satisfaction  of ( 28); in
particular,  if p <  1-i.e.  the degree of risk aversion is no greater  than  that  present  with  log
utilities-then  ( 28) must  be satisfied.  To consider p > 1, we note  that  the  left hand  side of
( 28) approaches  zero when p approaches  zero  and is strictly  concave  in p.  By  L'Hopital's
rule,  hm,_OO LHS  =  - In A >  0,  so  the  left  hand  side  must  also  be  strictly  increasing;
hence  - In A is the least  upper  bound  of the  LHS. Therefore,  a sufficient  condition  for the
bracketed  term  in equation  ( 27) to be positive,  no matter  what  value p takes,  is
-InA  <
or
A  > exp[- j--]  (29)
Evaluating  at  y = q, the upper  bound  on y the  left hand  side of ( 29)  is unity  and  the
right  hand side is exp[-l/(1-q)];  if q = 0.9, then  this  term is exp[-10],  which is 4.5x  10'.
Quite  obviously, y may  be very small and  still  satisfy  the  inequality.  To be  more concrete
still, suppose  that  q = 0.9 (there  is a ten percent  chance of unemployment),  arr  = 0.6, and
3 70f  course,  if we carry  out  the  thought  experiment  of raising  a given  middle  class  person's  probability
of unemployment  while holding  everyone  else's  (and  hence  the  tax  base)  fixed,  it is of course  the case  that
that  person  will want  a greater  tax rate.
27am  =  0.3.  Then  g  =  .87, the  right  hand  side of ( 29) equals  0.00046, and  A =  0.088;  we
satisfy  our  extreme  sufficient condition  with  two orders  of magnitude  and  almost  a  factor
of two  to  spare.  If one enjoys  plugging  parameters  into models,  one  could  hardly  seek  a
stronger  confirmation  of a  claim  than  is provided  for  our  argument  that  dr-/dk  <  0 at
k  = 0 when  bm  < 6
Continuing  with  our  analytical  treatment  of  the  Version  II  model,  we  note  that  in
general,  one  would expect  that  if the  policymaker  is interested  in  poverty  reduction,  we
will almost  always  have S,  > 0 (unless  r  is very large),  i.e.  from the  policymaker's  point
of view a slightly  greater  value of r  would be an improvement.  This  assertion  is buttressed
by  the  fact  that  in any  Nash equilibrium,  r  =  r-(k),  so  that  (if  T  E (0,1))  9Um/&r  =  0.
If  we  define  S'  as  that  part  of  S  that  corresponds  to  group  i's  utility,  i.e.  S'(k,T)  =
EhE  rhju(yi),  then  in  any  Nash  equilibrium  we will have  S'  > 0,  with  equality  only
if  S  is utilitarian  (i.e.  G  is the  identity  function).  lhence we  will always  have  S7 >  0
unless  ojS'  <  -aTS,  i.e.  unless  the  policymaker  views further  taxes  as detracting  more
(according  to the metric implicit  in G) from the rich than  adding  to the poor.  When there  is
no targeting,  it is straightforward  to show that  this event  is impossible.  We show the result
when  S is utilitarian;  adding  more  curvature  (i.e.  making  G  a  strictly  concave  function)
only  strengthens  the  result.  Since we are evaluating  at  k = 0,
S.  =  y[pu'(N) + qu'(N + JL)]
and
Sr=  -(r  - V)u'(N  + r[l - r])
Since rich agents'  incentive compatibility  constraint  must be satisfied,  we have r([ - T]  <
p.  Hence  the  u'  terms  are  greater  for  poor  than  for  rich agents.  As such,  a  sufficient
condition  for S,(O,  T)  to be positive  is ogy > o,,(r - y),  which can be shown to  be equivalent
to the  requirement  that  y < q, which has already  been  assumed.  Ilence  S(O, r)  > 0 for all
r  satisfying  (IC)r.
If S,  is positive  and  dr*/dk  is negative,  then  Equation  ( 20),  which  can  be  rewritten
as 5  =  -S,drl/dk,  implies  that  at  any  optimum,  Sk  must  be  positive!  Under  these
conditions,  when  empirical  work (like that  discussed  in  the  introduction  to  this  section)
shows that,  fixing the  budget,  an increase  in targeting  will improve  social  welfare,  we are
not entitled  to conclude that  transfers  are  being delivered inefficiently-at  least  not without
prior  knowledge that  the conditions  for Sr  > 0 > dr'/dk  are  violated.
This  result  really  is the  heart  of our  criticism  of policy  recommendations  based  on
empirical  findings that  Sk > 0, i.e.  that  the implementation  of indicator  targeting  would
reduce  poverty  given a  fixed rate  of taxation.  The approach  is incapable  of distinguishing
whether  the explanation  of the  apparent  gain  from increased  targeting  is inefficient  policy
design or a combination  of real concern for efficiency in targeting  the  poor  tempered  by  an
awareness of the  endogeneity  of the  budget  with  respect to  increased  targeting.
285.4  When  is  zero  targeting  a  Nash  equilibrium?
We need not stop there.  We now offer an example in which no targeting  is a (local)  optimum,
and  hence a  (local)  Nash equilibrium.38
With  CRRA  utilities,  it can be shown that  at  k = 0 we have
-(I  - 4  )T*(O)Z,  (30) ly  6
where
z  -1+  Py+  (  )P
We note  that  z  >  I if and  only p < 1.
Now suppose  that  the  policymaker  is as pro-poor  as possible,  and  chooses as her  social
welfare function  the  utility  of a representative  poor person.  Then  -SkIS 7 =  dri/dk.  From
the  proof of Lemma  3 it can be shown that  at  the  point  (O,r*(O)),  we have
dkrl(  T(01r  ))  =  (-  - 0)T*(°)  (31) dTk 
Hence zero targeted  transfers  is (locally) optimal  under  Version II if and  only if the RHS
of ( 31) exceeds  the expression  in ( 30), i.e. if and  only if the  politically-induced  reduction
in  the  tax  rate  that  occurs  when  a  small  amount  of targeting  is  introduced  exceeds  the
reduction  in the  tax  rate  that  would leave the  poor just  indifferent  given that  amount  of
targeting.  To think  of the  situation  graphically,  simply  replace  the  SW  curves of Figure  5
with  the  indifference curves  TI:  zero targeted  transfers  is locally  optimal  if and  only  r(k)
lies outside  poor  agents'  better-than  set  for all  k sufficiently close  to  zero.  Algebraically,
we have  optimality  if and  only if
d 61 <  Z( 6 -mJ  L _  ( 32)
This  condition  may be rewritten  as follows:
- < I -a  1  7  (33)
'The concept  of a "local"  Nash  equilibrium  is not standard;  what we mean  in that there  exists some
open  neighborhood  of the point (O,r'(0)) such that if the game  were  restricted  to that neighborhood,
(0,  r'(0)) would  be a Nash  equilibrium  of the restricted  game. As we discussed  above,  since  in Version  11
the policymaker  takes r'(k) -which  is the politico-equilibrium  value  of r conditional  on k-as given, Nash
equilibrium  is fully  described  by any  choice  of k solving  (  18),  a necessary  condition  for which  is that k solve
equation  ( 20). Unfortunately,  no primitive  conditions  exist under which  the function V(k)  S(k, r  (k))
is globally  concave  in k, so there is no guarantee  that any particular solution  of equation ( 20) is unique.
Moreover,  there remains  the question  of the second  order sufficiency  condition. Fortunately,  since we are
dealing with  a boundary  point, our argument  will  seek  to establish  conditions  under which  S&  +S?dr7ldk is
strictly  less  than  zero  when  all terms  are  evaluated  at (0,  r'(0)). If this inequality  holds,  then  we  must  have
a local  maximum  by definition,  since:  1) a local  maximum  is any  point  k where  V(k') < V(k) for  all  feasible
k' in some neighborhood  of k, 2) V'(0)  < 0 implies  there is some c such that  for all k' E (0, r), V(O) > V(k')
and  3) k' < 0 is not feasible.
29This  condition  requires  a  given middle  class person  to  be  sufficiently less  likely than
a  given  poor  person  to  receive  the  targeted  transfer.  Recall  that  in  condition  C  2  of
subsection  4.2,  however,  we required  the  opposite  to  hold:  poor  and  middle  class  agents
had  to have sufficiently close probabilities  of receiving targeted  transfers  (the condition  was
that  6m/6l  2  1 - q/r).  Thus  it is interesting  to  know when  the  two  conditions  may  be
satisfied jointly  and  when  they  are mutually  exclusive; they  may  be satisfied  jointly  if and
only if
q  > ar  y+1 
r  - (I1- a.)Vz  -am(1-
This  inequality  holds if and only if z > z  (=1  - y)/(q  - y).  It  is clear that  z'  is strictly
greater  than  unity,  so that  p must  be less than  unity  if our results  are  to be nonexclusive.
While  we are disappointed  with  this finding, p need not  be too much less than  unity;  it can
be shown  that  a sufficient condition  for z  > z* is for p to be less than
P* q  Y [X+q
As an example,  with p = 0.1 and  y = 0.6, we would need p < 0.82, not so different  from
log utilities.  It  is important  to recall  that  when  p = p*, there  is but  a  single value of the
ratio  Am/l6  for which both  our  results  may  hold.  While  this  fact  implies much lower levels
of risk aversion for which one might feel comfortable saying that  a broad  class of parameter
values are  likely to  satisfy  our  conditions,  it  is still  the  case  that  at  least one  of our  two
approaches  will suggest  that  targeting  fails the political  test.  Put  another  way, the  level of
risk aversion  will have to be fairly  high before one might comfortably  assert  that  neither  of
our  critiques  might  be valid for a broad  class of parameter  values.
Moreover, we stress  that  the low level of p required for both  results  to hold is an artefact
of our choice of social welfare function  (the utility  of a  representative  poor  agent).  Instead,
we might  have  chosen,  say, a  convex combination  of all  three  agents'  utilities.3 9 In  fact,
weightings always exist  for which a choice of zero targeting  is optimal  for the  policymaker,
no  matter  what  level risk  aversion  takes. 40 These  facts  go  a  long  way in  cementing  our
belief  that  both  the  social choice and  Nash  equilibrium  approaches  are  useful in  assessing
the  viability  of indicator  targeting.
It  might  be  objected  that  the  whole project  of assuming  a  social  welfare  maximizing
policymaker  is a sham,  anyway.  But  this  argument  is a nonstarter  within  the  contexts  of
current  debate  over  targeting,  since the  claim being  advanced  by proponents  of targeting
is precisely  that  social welfare would be improved with  more targeting.  Moreover, it seems
reasonable  to  believe  that  policymakers  typically  are  at  least  as  concerned  by  political
viability  as they  are about  first-best  (or n - 1 best)  program  design.  Also, policymakers  are
likely to  hold a  comparative  advantage  over economists  in assessing  the  political  viability
of various policies.
39Such  a choice  unambiguously  would  restrict the social better-than set.  Put another way, the slope
-ShI/S,  is increasing  in the amount  of weight  put on middle  clasn  or rich agents' utility.
4"That  is, there will  always  be some  weighting  under  which  our  condition  for local  (politically  constrained)
optimality  of zero targeting  requires  only  that 6m,/6i  not exceed  a number  greater than unity; but 6,,,  < 61
by assumption.
30To conclude  this  section,  we do  not  claim  that  whenever  non-targeted  programs  are
observed,  it  must  be the  case that  the  status  quo is optimal,  even  taking  political  factors
into  account.  However, we think  that  the  argument  advanced  in this  section  goes  a long
way in shifting  the  burden  of proof toward proponents  of targeting:  it is not  enough  simply
to  declare  that  in  a  world of fixed budgets,  program  efficiency can  be  enhanced  by  more
targeting.  Rather,  the political  costs of more focused transfer  delivery  must  be researched,
evaluated,  and  weighed against  the  economic benefits.
6  Empirical  Facts  Consistent  with  our  Model
In  this  section,  we argue  that  our  model  has  direct  practical  relevance,  particularly  to
policies  actively  being  considered  in  LDCs.  We first  consider  policy  prescriptions  flowing
from  recent  empirical  work and  then  turn  to some empirical  evidence that  both  is at  odds
with  those  prescriptions  and  supports  our  model.  While  we are  not  silly enough  to  think
that  a  model  as schematic  and  stylized  as ours  can be  "tested"  in  any  rigorous  sense,  we
do  think  our  model  is broadly  consistent  with three  strands  of evidence  about  government
spending  and  targeting.
First,  nearly  every incidence study  of benefits  of government  expenditures-even  those
aimed  at  social-welfare, e.g.  health  and  education-finds  that  benefits  are  at  best  no  more
progressive  than  would be a uniform  transfer  to all  citizens.  While  social expenditures  at
times  are progressive  relative  to  pre-transfer  income distribution,  typically  they  are  much
less progessively  distributed  than  would be  a  uniform  transfer.  Table  3 summarizes  the
results  of a  number  of such studies,  whose subjects  include  social  insurance,  health,  and
education.  These  programs  typically  constitute  the  bulk  of social  spending  in developing
countries.  We report  the  ratio  of benefits  received  by the  third  ("middle  class")  and  fifth
("richest") quntile  to  those  received  by  the  poorest  quintile.  In  nearly  every  instance,
the  per  capita  benefits  received by  the  middle  class  and  the  rich  exceed  those  received
by  the  poor.4".  Even  in programs  justified  exdusively  on  the  grounds  that  they  aid  the
poor,  the incidence of benefits is less progressive  than  would be a uniform  transfer  (see, for
instance,  Alderman  and  von Braun  (1984) on Egypt's  food subsidy).  As Birdsall  and  James
(1993) point  out,  a normative  model of how an egalitarian  social  welfare maximizer  would
distribute  benefits  makes a  poor positive  model of the  actual distribution  of government-
funded  benefits.
The second fact  supporting  our conclusions  is that  episodes of increased  targeting  have
been  followed by  reductions  in  overall  benefits,  as we  would  predict.  In  the  mid  1970s
Sri  Lanka  had  universal  food subsidies  that  provided  every citizen  with  a  rice  ration  at
subsidized  prices.  At  around  5 percent  of GDP,  the  program's  fiscal cost  was felt  to  be
unaffordable.  In  1978 the  government  restricted  the  ration  to  the  poorest  half  of the
410f course the distribution  of benefits  within the social  spending  categories  is very different  (e.g. uni-
versity versus primary  schooling,  public  health versus  hospitals). For  instance, Jimenez  (1994)  finds that
the median ratio of the fraction  of benefits  received  by the lower  40 percent  of households  to the middle  40
percent for all education  spending  is 1.23  (for  eight  countries)  and of public  health (not public  spending  on
health) is 1.27. Moreover,  since  poorer  households  tend to be larger than other ones, this fraction will be
greater than the analogous  one using  per capita benefits.
31Table 3: The ratio of benefits per person from various types of social expenditures accruing to
individuals in the third (middle) or fifth (richest) group' relative to the poorest.
Country  Type of social expenditure  Ratio of benefits b  income group:
Third to poorest  Richest to
poorest
Brazil  Education  1.18  1.55
Health  1.73  1.01
Social Insurance  6.31  12.34_
Total Social Spending (including  1.81  2.31
other categories not shown)  ._l
Vietnam  Education  1.48  3.38|
Health  1.80  2.49
Social Transfers  2.62  5.15
Uruguay  Education  0.51  0.44
Health  0.47  0.29
Social Security  1.65  2.48
Total Social Spending (including  0.91  1.16
other categories not shown)
Tanzania  Education (Primary and  1.14  2.64
Secondary)
Health  .94  1.70
Total (including water)  1.14  2.42
Ecuador  Education  1.32  1.43
Health  0.98  1.14
Kenya  Education (Primary and  1.18  0.97
Secondary)
Health  1.57  2.33
Peru  Education  1.67  1.67
Colombia  Health  1.06  0.79
Rural Programs  0.81  0.51
Indonesia  Health  1.56  2.42
1) The classifying groups are quintiles of either per capita consumption  or per capita income
except in Brazil, where the fives classes are defined by household income relative to the
minimum wage (e.g.  < 1/4 of minimum wage, 1/4 to 1/2, 1/2 to 1. I to 2,  >2).
Sources:  For Indonesia, van de Walle, 1994, for Peru,  Selden and Wasylenko, 1995. for the
rest various World Bank reports.population  and  in 1979 replaced the  rice ration  with a food stamp  program,  again  targeted
to the  bottom  half of the  population.  Since the introduction  of targeting  the  real  value  of
benefits  per  household  has  fallen to 40 percent  of its previous  level, from  Rs 425 to  Rs 170.
It is intriguing  to note  that  even with targeting  there  was substantial  leakage.  Calculations
from a  household survey indicate that  (in our notation)  6,m =  .38  <  6  =  0.43 <  bl =  .7.
These parameters  fit our story,  and it is also the case that  targeting  was far from "perfect",
so that  the  non-poor  had  ample  chance  in  absolute terms  to receive  the  targeted  subsidy.
While  it  is  impossible  to  say  what  would  have  happened  to  the  program's  budget  had
benefits  remained  universal  (since 5 percent  of GDP  simply  may  have been unsustainable),
the  fiscal  cost  of the  program  is now just  0.7  percent  of GDP.  More  of the  savings  came
from reductions  in the  magnitude  of the  transfer  than  from better  targeting.
A  similar  episode  ocurred  in  Colombia,  where  a  targeted  food  stamp  program  was
eliminated.  In terms  of the  differences between the technocratic  and  political  approaches,  a
recent  assessment  of poverty in Colombia (World Bank, [1994]) seems instructive:  "although
the program  seemed effective and  well targeted  in Colombia, it lacked political  support  and
was  discontinued."  Our  results  suggest  that  the  word  'although"  should  be  changed  to
"because".
Notwithstanding  our earlier disclaimer  regarding our model's  lack of direct  applicability
to developed  countries,  trends  in  U.S. social welfare spending  constitute  another  potential
example.  Only in the most radicaly  of anti-government  climates  has Medicare  become a po-
litically  viable target,  and Social Security  remains  totally  off-limits to budget  cutters.  Both
of these programs,  while benefiting  only the elderly at  any given moment,  are received uni-
versally (at least if the labor force is considered universal)  by people reaching  retirement  age.
By contrast,  every imaginable  "welfare"  program-AFDC,  food stamps,  Medicaid-targeted
to  the  poor  has  rested  squarely  on  the  anti-government  chopping  block.42 Interestingly,
unemployment  benefits,  which clearly do benefit the working and  middle classes, have been
maintained  in real  terms.  In fact, during  recessions,  when the  proportion  of potential  and
actual  middle class  UI recipients  is comparatively  large,  benefit duration  often  is extended.
Moreover,  we are  not  the  only  analysts  to  suggest  a  positive  link between  the  degree  of
targeting  for such programs  and the  erosion of political support  for  their financing  (see, for
example,  Skocpol [1991]).
Our  third  strand  of supportive  evidence  is the  cross-country  relationship  between  the
magnitude  of social welfare spending and  the degree to which it is targeted.  Figure  6 (taken
from  Milanovic  [1994]) shows the  association  between  the  degree  to  which  cash  transfers
are targeted  and  their overall magnitude  (as a fraction  of GDP).  The U.S. finds itself at one
pole,  with  highly  targeted  but  small overall transfers,  while pre-market-transition  Eastern
European  countries  inhabit  the other  extreme-large  transfers  with  hardly  any  targeting.
421t  will be interesting to see what happens  to Medicaid  funding  given  the exploding  share of program
spending  now directed at nursing  home costs for those elderly  people  who qualify  for Medicaid  only after
exhausting  (often-substantial)  savings  on such care.
32Iigmie 6:  Itevladioisliip  bel[veen  the magnitude  of cash  transrers  and their progressivity
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In this section,  we generalize the model to include a treatment  of altruism  and then  consider
empirical  findings concerning  the  extent  of altruism.  We believe  these  findings  are  incon-
sistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  altruism  can be an important  factor  in generating  publicly
financed  income  redistribution.  Nonetheless,  we use evidence from Sri Lanka to construct  a
back-of-the-envelope  calculation  of the degree of altruism  necessary  to invalidate  our  claim
that  the  general,  altruism-included  model  can  be  invoked to  explain  experiences  (like  Sri
Lanka's)  with  targeting.
7.1  Incorporating  Altruism  Into  The  Model
We  assume  that  the  "overall"  utility  of  the  middle  class  and  the  rich  may  be  written
as a  convex  combination  of own  utility  and  the  expected  utility  of a  representative  poor
person.43 This  approach  has the  virtue  of being easy  to think  about  intuitively:  if a  is the
weight  a  person  places on her  own consumption,  then  we might  think  of the  given  person
as admitting  a  probability  distribution  over  her  type,  with  the  probability  that  she  is  to
be of her  actual  type  equaling  a  and  the  probability  that  she is to be poor  equaling  1 - a.
Hence the  approach  has a certain  Rawisian  flavor:  people can be thought  of as considering
the  possibility  that  they  might  have been  in someone else's  shoes  before making  decisions
about  social  policy.44
We define the  functions
V,m(k,r) _GUm(k,T)  + (1 - a)Ul(k,r)
and
V7 . (k, r) _3Ur(k, r) + (1 - i3)U 1(k, r)
so  that  a  and  ,  are  the  respective  weights  placed  on  own  utility  by  middle  class  and
rich  agents  (we  assume  that  the  poor  care  only  about  their  own  consumption  and  that
the  rich  do  not  care  about  middle  class  consumption).  It  will  be  useful  to  define  the
'3The  convex  combination  part  of  this  assumption  has  no  substance,  as  it  follows directly  from  the
usumption  of additive  separability:  suppose  Vm _  oU,  + $1Ur  for  arbitrary  non-negative  constants  n, ,3;
then  all choices  regarding  targeting  and  taxation  are  the  same  as  if VI/(ar  +  d)  is used,  since  this  second
function  is a monotonic  transformation  of the  first,  and the  new  weights sum  to  unity.
"It  is worth  flagging a basic conceptual  problem  with this approach:  if there  are positive  levels of targeted
transfers,  some  people  who are  poor  by  type,  i.e.  have maximum  marginal  product  A, will  have  realized
post  -transfer  income  exceeding  that  of some  middle  class  type  agents.  This  event  occurs  because  some
poor  people  receive  the  targeted  transfer  0, while some middle  class people  are both  unemployed  and  do not
receive  9.  Moreover,  if taxes  and targeted  transfers  are large relative  to universal  transfers  and the  marginal
products  of middle  class  or  rich agents,  poor  people  receiving  targeted  transfers  may  receive  post-transfer
income  exceeding  that  of even employed  middle class or rich agents.  Hence the convex combination  approach
carries  with  it an explicitly  ex ante character:  it is best  interpreted  as altruism  defined  over possibilities,  not
outcomes.  One  might  try  to remedy  this  problem  by placing  a ceiling  on income  levels subject  to altruistic
feelings,  but  we reject  this  approach,  since it would only strengthen  our  claims  while playing  havoc  with  the
model's  tractability.
33function  r**(k)  _  arg maxt Vm(k, t).  As with  r',  elementary  mathematical  results  ensure
the existence,  continuity,  and,  when  aVm(k, 1)/Tr  <  0, differentiability  of r*T.
To review  the  basic  steps  taken  in  deriving  our  primary  results  above,  we  used  the
following facts,  true  under  assumptions  C 1 and  C 2:45
(I)  t9Um/Ok < 0, with  equality  possible only at  k = 0
(II)  OUl/ak  <  0
(III)  Single-crossing  between  any  two intersecting  Ti- and  T- curves,  with  the  former
crossing  the latter  from below
(IV)  a2Um/a9kOr <  0 for CRRA  utilities  with p <  1
To show (I),  we offered a descriptive  proof,  using the fact  that  when 6m < 6,  i.e.  when
C 1 holds,  targeted  transfers  are inferior  in expected  value to an actuarially  fair gamble;  the
result followed directly from this fact.  For the general case, i.e.  without  making  assumptions
on u or the  particular  proportion  6 of people receiving targeted  transfers,  this  approach  is
the  only  way to obtain  the  result.  A similar  condition  can be derived  when  we admit  the
possibility  of altruism,  but  it is less general.
At  first  glance,  the  logic of our proof of Lemma  1 suggests that  we need  only  continue
with  our  Rawisian  interpretation  of altruism,  and derive a condition  under  which  the  total
"probability"  that  our  non-poor  agent  will receive a  targeted  transfer,  taking  into  account
the  "probability"  that  she  will  be  poor",  is less than  the  proportion  of the  population
receiving  the  transfer.  IHowever,  it turns  out  that  if we want  our result  to  hold for general
preferences,  this  condition,  which may  be  written  as acrm  + (I  - a)6,  <  6 for  the  middle
class,46 cannot  always be shown to be sufficient. The basic logic is as follows. If 0+p  <  l-r,
employed  middle  class people-even  those not  receiving 0-always  have higher  consumption
than  do employed  poor people.  Hence with probability  1 - a, employed  middle  class people
who  "become"  employed poor  people will "need"  0 more than  will employed  middle  class
people who 'remain"  middle class. 47 As such, these middle class people will place a premium
on targeted  transfers,  reflecting the chance that  poor people whose need for them  is greater
will receive them.  Hence without  saying more  about  the shape  of u,  we are entitled  to use
the above condition  only when O+p >  I - r,  in which case the opposite  calculation  is made:
employed middle  class people not receiving 0 have a higher marginal  utility  of consumption
than  do  employed  poor people  who do  receive  0.  For the  rich,  however,  the  requirement
on  0 is stronger  still:  we must  have 0 + p  >  r(l  - r);  all  other  details  of the  preceding
discussion  apply  directly.
45We wish  to  note  that  in  this  section  we do  not  deal  with  a  number  of technical  issues  handled  in the
no-altruism  case  (e.g.  accounting  for  the  incentive  compatibility  constraint  when  p  4  0).  While  a  fuUl
treatment  would  require  some  such  issues  to  be  resolved,  others  of  them  no longer  are  important,  largely
because  the  introduction  of altruism  requires  that  all attention  in the  social choice  approach  be  focused  on
local  rather  than  global equilibria.  We have chosen  to ignore  those details  that  remain,  on the  grounds  that
there  is nothing  intuitive  or  challenging  in handling  them.
"For  the  rich, since  6,  = 0,  the condition  would be  (I - ,)6b  < 6,  but  this condition  will turn  out  to  hold
in all cases we consider  below.
47Our focus  is on  the employed  of both  classes  because  in  the event  of unemployment,  members  of  both
classes  receive  zero  pre-transfer  income.  Hence differences  in  post-transfer  income  for  unemployed  agents
derive  solely from differences  in 6 b  and 6,.  lhence the  'naive"  condition  in the  text  is sufficient  for that  part
of expected  utility  related  to the  unemployed  state,  i.e.  that  part  multiplied  by p.
34We now offer two very similar conditions that  allow us to generate in Lemma 5 results
analogous to (I) and (IV).
C 3
cram  + (1 - a)bl + q(1 - ca)(6L  - 6)(u'(A) - 1) < 6
C 4
o4,, + (1  )6l + (1-  )(<,  - 3 )(u'(s)-1)  <  6
Lemma  5 (When  Altruistic  Middle Class  Agents  Oppose Targeting)  (i) Suppose
C 3 is satisfied.  Then  49Vm/t9k  < 0 for k  = 0.
(ii)  Suppose  that  C 4 is satisfied  and  that utilities  are of the  CRRA  form,  with  p < 1.
Then  022Vm/OkOr < 0 for  k = 0.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
The intuitive explanation of why C 3 gives the lemma's first result is simple enough. The
term Ga6m  + (1 - a)6i plays the role explained above, while the remaining term on the LHS
is a correction factor for the greater marginal utility of income experienced by employed
poor than employed middle class people. This correction term has four components. The
q occurs because the correction need be made only for differences  in middle class and poor
marginal utilities occurring in the employed state.  The (1-  a)  part reflects the fact that
the problem arises only when middle class agents place some weight on the utility of the
poor.  The (6i - T) term is a measure of the gain (relative to  an actuarially fair gamble)
from targeting received by a poor person (at k = 0).  The last term, (u'(%) - 1), reflects
the difference  in marginal utilties  of consumption between employed poor and middle-class
agents (as we detail in the lemma's proof, we choose I as a normalization for u'(1)).
As for the second condition and the lemma's second result, the only difference in the
two conditions is the absence of the q in the third LHS term in C 4.  Explaining why this
difference  is necessary is less easy than explaining the roles of the other components of the
condition. Because the poor are not taxed while middle class are, an increase in targeting
has a different (i.e.  non-proportional) impact on the redistributive efficiency of taxation
for the two types of agents.  Beyond that,  all that  can be said is that  the algebra plays
out  in such a  way that  an analytical sufficient condition may be obtained  only via the
strengthening of C 3 into C 4.
It should be easy to see that the deviation of C 3 from its naive counterpart is increasing
in the degree of altruism (i.e. in  1 - a,  the weight middle class people put  on the utility
of the poor).  Second, this deviation is increasing in the excess of 6i over 6,  since the
poor benefit from targeting more as they become relatively  more likely to receive targeted
transfers. Third, the deviation of C 3 from its naive counterpart is increasing in the excess
35of the  marginal  utility  of consumption  of the employed poor  over that  of the  middle  class,
since  the  greater  is this  difference,  the  greater  is the  relative  need  of the  employed  poor
(by  comparison  to  the  employed  middle  class),  and  hence  the  greater  is  the  "premium"
middle  class agents  place on the value of targeting.  It is important  to  note  that  except  for
the  income of the rich and  the probability  of unemployment,  all of the  model's  parameters
now  affect  our  (strong)  sufficient  condition  for  middle  class  agents'  utility  to  be  strictly
decreasing  in the degree of targeting.  Hence more risk aversion or lower (relative)  income of
the poor  each makes violation of the condition more likely, just  as altruism  does.  Moreover,
these  effects  interact,  so  that  small  amounts  of altruism  in  very  poor,  very  well targeted
(i.e.  61 >>  ) economies may lead to the violation of the condition;  the  converse is of course
also true:  large degrees of altruism  will make little difference (relative  to the basic Rawlsian
condition)  in economies  with  fairly  equal  left-tail  income distributions  and  poor  targeting
technology.
The  second  result  of the  previous  lemma  is as far  as we will go in  extending  the  Nash
equilibrium  results.  The lemma  makes it clear that  the condition  under  which dr**/dk  < 0-
namely  that  OUml/kCOr  < 0-is not knife edge in character.  Moreover, we can always choose
an  a  close enough  to  unity  to  be in a close enough  neighborhood  of the  no-altruism  case.
However,  to  actually  calculate  a  threshold  level c*  (as  a  function  of the  model's  other
parameters)  such that  the  Nash equilibrium  results  of Section  5 hold  for a  > a  would be
time  consuming,  and,  we think,  not  terribly  intuitive.  The  point  is that  such a level must
exist  and,  for fixed parameters,  be bounded  away from unity.  By contrast,  our social choice
results  may be generalized  analytically  without  much trouble.
For  reasons  that  will become  apparent,  our  results  in  this  section  do  not  require  us
to  offer conditions  under  which  9VI/Ok < 0;  this  result  will be  shown  to  follow directly
from other  conditions  developed  here.  As for extending  result  (III),  this  task  might  seem
foreboding:  it now requires  that
drl  _  OUI/Ok
Sik  OU  01/r
di%  P8Ur/Ok + (I -,3)OUI/Jk  (34)
dk  baU 7/13r  + (I -3)OU,i/Or
and  at  first  blush,  there  seems no  particular  reason  to  believe  that  C 2 should  generalize
directly.  Nonetheless,  this  concern  will be shown to be  without  foundation.
We begin  by defining  the  following relation  (which may  be  either  a  function  or  corre-
spondence)  analogous  to rr:
;,(k;  V)  -{r:  Vr(k, r)  =  V}
Hence the family of f,  maps describes the level sets of now-altruistic  rich agents.  Before
proving  two useful lemmas,  we note  that  the equilibrium  status  of (0,r**(0))  to  be shown
below  in general  is  neither  global  nor  local:  we show in  Theorem  6  that,  under  certain
conditions,  there  is a definite,  non-local part of the feasible set over which this  point  can be
shown to  have equilibrium  status,  even though  that  part  need not  be the  whole set.  While
36the  result  to  be proved  is a single-crossing  result,  there  may  be multiple  segments  to  the
level set  ;,,  so that  even when  single-crossing  holds  for that  part  of f,. "near"  (O,r**(O)),
the  point  (0, T*(O))  is not  a global equilibrium.  Such  a situation  is depicted  in  Figure  7a:
a  point  like a  always allows a coalition  between  poor  and  altruistic  rich agents.  Figure  7b
shows the one-segment,  global equilibrium case. 48 As Figure  7a should  make clear, aRlowing
the  rich to  be altruistic  implies that,  at  least  at  some points,  they  may  prefer  increases  in
targeting.  Thus  no  intuitive  restrictions  are  available  under  which  we may  offer a  global
characterization  of rich agents'  better-than  sets, nor,  therefore,  of the  intersection  of these
better-than  sets  with  those of poor  agents.  Nonetheless,  the  following  two lemmas  allow
us to characterize  altruistic  rich agents'  better-than  sets locally  and  to be sure  that  certain
points-namely  those  not in poor or non-altruistic  rich agents'  level or better-than  sets-are
not  in altruistic  rich agents'  level or better-than  sets.  The lemma  rules out  situations  like
that  depicted  in  Figure  8.
Lemma  6  B,(k, r)  C B,(kT,r) U B,(k,r).
Proof:  Because  V, is a convex combination  of U, and  Ul, it must  lie between  them.  HIence
any  point (k, ir)'  E Br n B, (where Ac denotes  the complement  of A) must  yield utility  levels
U'  < U,  and  Ul <  Ul.  Similarly,  points  in agent  i's level set yield  U'  =  Us and  U.  <  Uj.
Therefore,  V,  >  V',  so  there  exist  £k  and  f,  such  that  for  a  point  (k',r')  E  L,(k,r),
V,(k  + Ek,  r' + Cr) <  Vr  (k, r).
Q.E.D.
The next  lemma shows that  our single crossing result  locally withstands  the introduction
of altruism,  so long as altruistic  rich agents  prefer reductions  in  r at  the point  in question.
Lemma  7 (A  Local  Version  of  the  Single-Crossing  Result  With  Altruism)  Both dn/dk  >
dr,/dk  and OV,/Or < 0 if and only if both drl/dk > d;,/dk  and OVr/Ok  < 0.
Proof: See Appendix  3.
To understand  Lemma  7, consider a  point  where,  given no altruism  on  the  part  of the
rich,  no  rich-poor  coalition  can agree on  a local increase  in the  degree of targeting.  Then
if it  is also true  that  the  rich-given  non-zero  altruism-prefer a  local reduction  in  the  tax
rate,  two things  must  be true:  1) no rich-poor  coalition  can agree on a local increase  in the
degree  of targeting,  even given non-zero  altruism;  and  2) the  altruistic  rich must  prefer  a
local reduction  in the degree of targeting.  Thus,  at  least at  such points,  the  introduction  of
altruism  does not  alter  the  critical  characteristics  of rich agents'  utilitiy  functions,  namely
that  they  be decreasing  in both  k and  T  and  that  they induce  level curves that  single-cross
with  those of poor  agents.
With  the  aid  of an additional  lemma,  this  result  will become  quite  forceful.  We now
show that  with  when  there  is no targeting  (k  = 0),  risk  aversion is sufficiently  small,  and
4"In  technical  terms,  we  know of  no general  (and  not  terribly  restrictive)  conditions  under which  rich
agents' level- and better-than sets are guaranteed to be connected.  Standard mathematical  results guarantee
the existence,  continuity, and differentiability of one part of the level set  fr  'near'  any given point,  but  they
do not  rule  out  other  such  parts.  We can  say that  non-connected  level and  better-than  sets  would  require
a discrete  amount  of altruism,  since  the sets  are connected  with  no altruism.
37Figure  7a:  The  point  (0,r*(O)) is  a
local, but not global, equilibrium.  It
can be beaten by a coalition of poor and
altruistic  rich  agents,  each  of  whom
prefer the point a.  This event happens
only  because,  as  drawn,  the  level  and




Figure  7b:  The  point  (O,  r**(O))  is  a
global equilibrium.(9ji
Figure  8:  Altruistic  rich  agents'  level
sets cannot look like the one drawn in
this picture.  Any point in region  c is
worse  than  the point (O,r)  for  both  poor
and  non-altruistic  rich agents; since
altruistic rich  agents' utility is  a
convex combination  of these  two groups'
utilities,  points  in  C  must  also  be worse
than (0,r)  for altruistic  rich  agents.middle  class voters  are  at  least as altruistic  as rich ones,  the  rich always  will prefer  a tax
lower than  that  which  is optimal  for the middle  class.
Lemma  8  (When  Altruistic  Rich  Agents  Favor  Lower  Taxes  at  (0, r*-(O)))  Suppose
that utilities  are CRRA  with p < 1, and that ,B  > (>) a,  i.e.  rich agents  weight  'own'  utility
at least as heavily as do middle  class ones.  Then  8vIk=o  =  0 implies  that  9  jk=o  <  0
Proof: See Appendix  3.
The  condition  p  <  1 has  reared  its  head  again;  we emphasize  that  this  condition  is
sufficient  only,  and  a  review  of the  lemma's  proof  should  convince  the  reader  that  it  is
far  from  necessary  in general.  We now can state  the  following proposition  and  theorem.
Proposition  2 establishes  the  range  of values of k  and  T  over which  no coalition  between
poor  and  altruistic  rich agents  can  defeat  (0,r*`(0));  Figure  9 depicts  an  example  of this
range.  Theorem  6  combines  this  result  with  Lemma  8 to  establish  that  (0, r*(0))  has
equilibrium  status  over  the  full  range  of  (k, r)  values  described  in  Proposition  2.  The
following definitions  will be useful for the results  that  follow.
A(k, r)  {_  (k, T)  (k, r)  E B,(k, T)  n B,(0, r)}  (35)
C*,(;) _ {(k, r):  (k, r)  E L,(o, f) n B,(O, ;)  U Lr(O  ,)}  (36)
Hence A(k, r)  is the set of all points  preferred  to (k, r)  by both  poor  and  altruistic  rich
agents; it is a subset (not necessarily proper) of W(k, r), the win-set of (k, r)  when there
is altruism.49 For k  = 0 and  tax  rate  ;,  C,(;)  is the  set of all  points  that  are  exactly  as
good as (0,; ) from the point of view of altruistic rich agents and no worse than (0, ;)  from
the point of view of non-altruistic rich agents.
Proposition  2  Suppose  the  conditions  of  Lemmas  8-are  satisfied.  Then  (k,r)  E C,(f)
implies that neither (k,  )  nor (k,r)  is in A(k,r).
Proof: See Appendix  3.
Theorem  6 (Existence  of Equilibrium  at  (0, r*'(O)))  Suppose that middle class and
rich agents are altruistic and that the conditions of Lemmas86hold. Then (0, T*(O))  is a
local equilibrium  if C S holds.
Proof: When  the  results  of Lemmas  4-hold,  there  will always  be an open  ball  0  such that
(k,r)  E C,(To-(O))  *  (k,r)  E O  n F.  lhence  the  set of points  over which  W(O,  r*(O))  was
shown  in  the  Proposition  to  be empty  always contains  some  neighborhood  of (0, r**(O)),
which,  by Lemma  5, is itself  the global optimum  for altruistic  middle  class agents.
Q.E.D.
"0f  course, at any point where Bm(k,  r) = O,  i.e. at middle class agents' optimum, it must  be true that
A(k, r) = W(k, r)
38We note  that  while the  conditions  of Lemmas  5- 8  are  sufficient  for  the  proposition
and  theorem,  they  are  by no  means necessary.  The  proposition  and  theorem  require  only
the  results of the  lemmas,  for  which  the  lemmas'  conditions  are  sufficient,  not  necessary.
Thus  there  will exist  parameter  values violating  the  lemmas'  conditions  but  still  yielding
the proposition  and  theorem.
For those  readers  who believe that  altruism  is an important  issue in  assessing  transfer
programs'  political  viability,  the importance  of this  theorem  should  not  be  understated.
It  says  that  our  model generalizes  directly  to the  non-zero  altruism  case, with  only  minor
modifications  in the values other  parameters  must  take.  The  single-crossing  result  is essen-
tially  unchanged,  requiring  only that  middle class voters  prefer higher  taxes  (when  there  is
no targeting)  than  do rich voters.  As we argued  above,  some analysts  might  debate  such a
requirement,  but  we think  it is a natural  one  to make,  and  any argument  about  the  issue
really  seems  subordinate  to our  primary  concern,  which  is political  support  for  targeting
in an  otherwise  standard  model.  As for the  condition  under  which  altruistic  middle  class
voters  will continue  to favor no  targeting,  we do  not assert  that  it need always  be satisfied
in practice  (our  argument  in the  following subsection  aside).  However, we stress  yet  again
that  the issue  has been reduced  to  an empirical  one:  the objection  that  our  model  is struc-
turally  unable  to handle  altruism  simply is false, leaving only arguments  over the degree of
altruism  actually  observed  in the world.
Before  turning  to this  question,  we revisit  Sri  Lanka's  experience,  using  it to  calculate
the  critical  level of altruism  above  which  the  results  of this  section  will not  hold.  Recall
C 4:
a6m + (1-  a)6l + (1 - a)(6i  - 6)(u'(p)  - 1) S °
This  inequality  may  be restated  as
a  (6( - T)u'(p)  + Ti-
To calculate  the value of u for Sri Lanka, we take the ratio of the average income  for the
bottom  two income quintiles  to median income, which yields the value of 0.42.  Assuming  log
utilities,  we have u'(p)  =  I/,us. Recalling from the previous  section that  61 = 0.7, Em  = 0.38,
and  6 = 0.43,  we may calculate  from the expression  above that  the  threshold  level of a  is
0.54, so that  middle  class agents  would have to  place a  weight of 0.46 on the  utility  of the
poor  to  invalidate  our  conditions.  Is this  plausible?  We think  not,  as we describe  in  the
next  subsection.
7.2  Empirical  Facts  About  Altruism  and  About  Poverty
We begin  in this  subsection  by  arguing  that  the  kind  of altruism  that  is relevant  for the
current  discussion  is  what  we call  "general  social,  consumption-related'  (GC)  altruism.
Since  there  are  many  types  of behavior  that  may  be  construed  broadly  as  altruistic,  we
emphasize  that  altruism  need be neither  consumption-related  nor motivated  by a  desire to
boost  the welfare of people the altruistic  actor  does not know.  For example,  many charitable
organizations  promote  consumption  of particular  goods,  irrespective  of the  income  level or
39preferences of the intended recipients (religious  proselytizing  constitutes one such example).
Second, transfers may not be reciprocated immediately, even if they are part  of long-tqrm
implicit insurance contracts (for example, transfers made to  one's children to guarantee
care in old age). Since neither of these kinds of transfers reasonably may be interpreted  as
concern for unknown beneficiaries'  consumption-based standard of living, neither  qualifies
as GC altruism.
We believe two facts about the world are grossly inconsistent with the hypothesis that
people exhibit large degrees  of altruistic concern for the consumption of other citizens. First,
even within families,  income transfers are relatively small and do not appear to be motivatied
primarily by altruism.  Any given person i's  concern for j's  well-being reasonably can be
expected to  decline with the social distance between the two people.  Hence, estimates
of altruism-based transfers within nuclear families (i.e.  between parents and  children or
between siblings) should constitute a high upper-bound on the degree of GC altruism.
But intrafamilial altruism seems to be quite small. Although interhousehold transfers are
greater in some developing countries than in the U.S. (see Cox (1987]  for the U.S. and Cox
and Jimenez [1992]  for Peru), Scheoni  (1993) found that across U.S. households in 1988,  the
average transfer from parents to children was just $328. Given the small observed amount
of transfers across households  and the enormous differences  in incomes  across generations, 50
it is no surprise that Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff  (1992) easily reject the hypothesis that
the extended family is linked altruistically. And despite large differences in consumption
across siblings, transfers received from siblings or other  relatives averaged just  $44-one
tenth of one percent of household  income-for the U.S. in 198851.  The weight of this evidence
suggests a very low degree of intrafamilial altruism.
In the face of this evidence on voluntary redistribution, we find it  not credible that
"general social" altruism can explain the comparatively large amount of income actually
redistributed through the public sector. Paradoxically, we also believe that  the amount of
actual income redistribution is too 8mall to admit both large degrees of GC altruism and
observed levels of poverty and deprivation; there is simply too much poverty for there to
also be much altruism. 52 Sen's (1995) remark suggests the degree to which self-interest
seems to drive observed transfers to the poor:
The political feuibility of such differential use of public services [i.e. of targeting] depends to a
considerable extent on what the more powerful  groups in a poor country see as imperative.  For
example, eaily  infectious diseas  receive much greater attention than other types of maladies
do,  and  they  tend  to  get eliminated with remarkable efficiency. It has  happened  to small
pox, nearly happened to malaria, and is on the way to happening to cholera.  Even the  poor
would tend to get a lot of attention  partly for good humanitarian reasons, but  lo  because
a  poor person with infectious disease is a source of infection for others.  Ailments that  are
not so infectious, including regular undernourishment, do not get quite that  comprehensive
attention.
50Moreover, both Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) show that  the correlation  of fathers'  and  sons'
incomes in the U.S. is only about 0.4.
"t There are models suggesting that large degrees  of altruism are consistent with no inter-sibling transfers,
but we find such models less compelling than the simpler hypothesis of small degrees of altruim.
52And it appears that  the level of contributions by US residents to international charities supports  this
view: according to Wolpert (1993), this figure was just  2.6 billion in 1991.  Moreover, data  in  Ribar and
Wilhelm (1994) suggest that  this number probably may weU  be a high upper bound.
40I sometimes wonder whether there is any way of making poverty terribly infectious.  If that
were to happen, its general elimination would be, I am certain, remarkably rapid.
Of course, Sen's sentiment brings up an important dimension of non-altruistic concern
for the welfare of the poor.  We have treated the motivation for including the welfare of
the poor in non-poor agents' utilities as altruistically based, but  there are at  least three
other  reasons for doing so.  First,  lower welfare for the poor may be  asscociated with
direct welfare costs borne by the non-poor (e.g. Sen's infectious externalities).  Second, the
threat  of distruptive political action is likely to be related to the economic welfare of the
poor 53. Third, raising the welfare of the poor might cause beneficial spillovers to the non-
poor. Some new growth models posit a positive link between threshold levels of education
and economic growth, so that  higher welfare  for the poor actually will raise growth rates,
benefitting the non-poor as well. In light of these possible motivations, perhaps the reasons
for direct concern by the non-poor about the welfare  of the poor have nothing to do with
altruism.  But proper treatment of such considerations would warrant separate models, and
in any event these issues are beyond the scope of the current work.
8  Conclusion
In this paper, we have reviewed briefly some recent literature whose central theme is that
the use of permanent income characteristic indicator targeting would allow policymakers
to reduce poverty. We then developed a simple and general model, which we used to show
two main conclusions. First, while social choice  theory suggests that it is unsurprising that
positive levels of targeted transfers almost never (in the measure-theoretic sense) can exist
in equilibrium, we develop simple conditions-that targeted transfers are no better  for the
middle class than  an actuarially fair gamble and  that  rich and  poor agents not  be able
to agree on more targeting and less taxation-under which no targeting  is an equilibrium.
Second, we argue that  the empirical finding that  introduction of targeting  with  a fixed
budget could greatly improve social welfare in fact has no power. this finding is perfectly
consistent with Nash equilibrium in a game played by voters and a social-welfare  maximizing
(e.g.  poverty minimizing) policymaker.  Moreover, we give an  example in  which a  no-
targeting transfer regime satisfies the median voter's optimization problem and also locally
satisfies the policy-maker's optimization problem; a no-targeting regime can thus exist in
what we refer to as local Nash equilibrium.
We have three further remarks. First, like all models,  ours is stylized and not immune to
attack.  Nonetheless, we think the ball now is squarely  in the other court. We have presented
a positive political economy model in which simple conditions imply that  introduction of
indicator targeting will have budget-reducing effects, and in which ignoring these effects
can reduce the welfare of the poor. Even if our model is not to be accepted, proponents of
indicator targeting should be able to produce at least some plausible positive model in which
the fixed-budget approach does  lead to an optimal outcome. And of course, simply assuming
the budget is fixed counts neither as plausible nor as a model. A positive recommendation
5 3 Glewwe  writes that  "Use of dummy variables for ethnic groups helps in targeting transfers but.  . . this
practice could lead, quite literally, to riots in the streets."
41to a policymaker  that  she "should"  target  ought to be a recommendation  that  takes  account
of constraints  actually  faced  by that  policymaker.
Second,  since  both  types  of  transfers  we discuss  in  this  model  are  financed  with  a
proportional  tax, each is enormously  redistributive.  Therefore,  to suggest  that  targeting  is
likely to be politically  infeasible or budget-reducing  is not to say that  redistribution  relative
to pre-transfer  income distribution  is infeasible.  Our point  is that  there  are practical  limits
to  not  only  the  scope,  but  also the  form of redistribution.5 4 One  need  not  believe  that
current  patterns  of government  expenditures  reflect the scope limits to argue  that  the form
constraints  bind.  Just  as our  model's  negative  conclusions  regarding  targeting  hold  only
under  certain  conditions,  whether  a greater  total  reduction  in poverty  is feasible  via more
targeting  at lower budgets or no targeting  at existing  budgets is fundamentally  an empirical
question.  To pretend  otherwise  is to rely more on rhetoric  than  on  rigor.
Third,  it  would  be somewhat  awkward  to  discuss  a  positive  political  economy  model
without  also  discussing  the  positive  politics of partisans  on  both  sides  of the  targeting
debate.  In fact,  attitudes  towards  targeting  span  the  political  spectrum:  while  political
positions  taken  by  partisans  appear  to depend  on  empirical  beliefs  about  political  reality,
they  do not seem to be related  systematically  to general ideological fault  lines.  People  who
care about  the  poor  may  favor or oppose targeting,  depending  on  their  beliefs concerning
the  political  reaction  function,  r-,  derived  above.  For those  who believe  that  budgets  are
exogenous  and  cannot  be influenced,  improved targeting  seems  to  be the  right  strategy  to
protect  the poor.  To others,  opposition  to targeting  is de ngeur:  near-term  implementation
of targeting  is expected  to cause long-term  erosion of political  support  for all redistribution.
By  contrast,  strongly  anti-statist  people (who  we certainly  do  not  mean  to  imply  are
indifferent  to  the  plight  of the  poor)  might  easily  be  in  favor  of  targeting  rather  than
univeralism.  Consider,  for  example,  Deepak  Lal  (1994),  who  writes  that  "An  implicit
objective  of those  who  argue  against  targeting  and  in favor  of univeral  welfare  states  is
distributivist.  This  is not  surprising  as they  are  by  and  large  socialists  who  subscribe  to
the  common end  of egalitarianism"  (our italics).
In final summary,  this  paper  has sought  to show that  the  policy  maker  in the  opening
dialogue  might  really be right.  It  is theoretically  and empirically  reasonable  to believe that
attempts  to achieve "more for the poor"  through  the use of indicator  targeting  may in fact
mean  less for the  poor.
54Non-  lump sum-i.e. non-indicator-targeting  might  fare  considerably  better. For example,  self-selection
targeting  programu  make  benefits  universally  available  to anyone  willing  to accept  certain conditions.  Thus
the Nichols  and Zeckhauser  (1982]  approach  to targeting  not only  handles  incentive  compatibility  issues,  but
may also solve political  economy  problems. Public works  jobs form one example of such programs: since
middle  class  agents can anticipate  the availability  of their benefits  in times of need, they are much more
likely  to support such  programs.  This logic  might  explain  the apparently  solid political backing  enjoyed  by
the Employment  Guarantee  Scheme  in Maharashtra.
42Appendix  1: Proofs of Results  in Section 4
Lem-a  2  Suppose is = 0.  Then y < q, i.e.  ,r  < q(l - oem),  if and only if
(i) r(0)  <  1 and
(ii) At least one of 8U,^/8r,  aUm/fk  < 0 at any point (k, 1)
Proof: To show (i), differentiate U..  partially with respect to r.  When we evaluate at  k = 0, there  will be
no difference across targeting states in after-transfer income. Hence we have
1rn  =pyu'(N)-q(l-y)(N  + I-r)  (37)
At r =  1, the u' terms drop out, so we have
py 2  q(l - y)
which is just  another way of writing 7 < q. Hence utility is decreasing in r  at (0,1).
As for (ii), it can be shown that
aam  =fmk  a- m  + Pit6rnU'(N  + O)  + (I-  r)u'(N)]
- g(l.-I)[6mu'(N  + O  + I-r)  +(1  -fn)u'(N  + 1-r)]  (38)
Substituting  r =  1, we see that  the terms multiplied by pg and q(l  -g)  are equal, so that  this part  of
8U,,,/r  can be non-negative only if pV > q(l - 1), which again implies y < q.  Hence under  the lemma's
hypothesis, aUrn/ar  can be non-negative only if either BUm/clk is not.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 (Slngle Crossing for r, &  n)  If  C 2 is satisfied, then
(i) Any two indifference curtce rt(k; Us) and r7(k; c.)  intersect at most once
(ii) If ri(k)  = rr(k),  then n(k)  <  (>) r,(k)  V k  < (>)k
For k = 0, (i)  and (ii)  hold only  if C 2 is satisfied.
Proof: We first dispense with the case when 61 < b, i.e.  when C I  is satisfied (note that  C 2 is satisfied
trivially in this case, since its left hand side is negative). We know that BU1/Br  > 0, and from Lemma 1,
we also have aUl/Bk  < 0.  By the Implicit Function Theorem,
dn  _  BUe/lk  (39)
dk  _Uu/8r'
so that  in this case, dr,/dk  > 0.  We also know that  the utility of the rich is decreasing in both k  and
r,  which implies that  dr,/dk  <  0  (we could derive this  result algebraically by differentiation of  10 with
respect to k).  Hence we have one strictly increasing function and one strictly decreasing function, and  the
conclusions of the  Lemma are obvious in this circumstance. We now turn  to the case in which Et > 6.
First, writing out the right hand side of ( 39) after dividing by 6ly, we have
drl
dk;
(k)  [y(pu'(N  + O) + qu'(N  + O  +  p)}  - -yspu'(N)  + qu'(N  +  p)f]
(1 + ik)(pu'(N  + O) + qu'(N + O +#)]  +  yn(l-k)[pu'(N)  + qu'(N +pu)]
43We will want  to derive  a lower bound  for dn/dk  >  0, so we are  free to do anything  to ( 40) that  makes
the  right  hand  side smaller.  Thus  we replace  pu'(N)  + qu'(N  +  p)  with pu'(N  + O) + qu'(N  +O+,a)  in both
the  numerator  and  the  denominator.  We can  do this  with  the  numerator  since  this  part  of the  numerator
is positive  and  pu'(N  + 9) +  qu'(N  + 5  +  A)  < pu'(N)  +  qu'(N  + p)  (by concavity  of u).  The  numerator
thus  becomes
-n(k)(pu'(N  + O)  + qu'(N  + O  + p))[7  - zy],
and  -y  - > 0 since T < 61  by hypothesis.  Since the denominator  is strictly  positive,  the  whole  (modified)
term  must  be  negative.  We  are  therefore  free  to  reduce  the  value  of  the  denominator,  since  reductions
in the  denominator  of  a negative  term  make  the  term  more  negative,  i.e.  smaller.  Thus  we may  replace
pU'(N)  + qu'(N  + p)  with  pu'(N  + 9) + qu'(N  + O  + p)  in the denominator  as well; but  this  step  allows  us
to cancel  out  all terms  in ( 40) involving  u,  leaving  us with  the simple  result  that
dn >  -n(k)  7  +(1- 7g+k  (40)
This  inequality  holds  strictly  for all  k  >  0 and  with  equality  at  k  =  0.  Next,  differentiating  r,  with
respect  to k,  we have
dr,  yr  (41)
dk  r -(I  - k)v
Combining  (  40) and  ( 41),  we have dn/dk  > dr./dk  (with  equality  only  at  k =  0,  and  then  only  if
(42)  holds  with  equality)  if
- n(k)l  +(1 -*)71+  I  7 >  r  r  -(1  - t)y(42)
By hypothesis,  we want  to consider  points  (k,;)  such  that  n(k)  =  r,(i)  =  r.  We may  thus  cancel  n
and  r,  from  the above  expression;  simplifying  further,  all i  terms  drop  out,  and  we are left  with  the  simple
condition  that  6/61  >  I - q/r,  which  is just  condition  C  2.  Hence when  C 2 is satisfied,  n is at  least  as
steeply  sloped  as is r,  at  any point  of intersection  (and  strictly  more  steeply  sloped  for all k > 0).  This  fact
implies  that  n  must  cross  r,  from  below at  any  point  of intersction  with  k  >  0.  Hence  by continuity  of
both  n and  r,,  if n intersects  r,  at  some value  k of k, it  must  lie above  r,  for  all k >  k and  vice-versa  for
all k < k.  Hence the  second conclusion  of the  lemma  holds;  but  this conclusion  actually  implies  the  first.
Q.E.D.
Lemma  4  At least  one of C  I or C 2 is satisfied.
Proof:  Rewrite  C  I as 6m =  atbiAl/(al + o,),  where the condition  is satisfied  iff A < 1.  Then  we can  rewrite
C  2 as  follows:
r<  q e,  r+  e(l  -A)
or
r(e,.  +  at(l  - A)) S  q  (43)
44Violation  of both  conditions  requires  the  inequality  to  be  reversed  in  the  above  expression,  as well  as
A >  1.  But we assumed  earlier  that  y =  ar,r + qorm < q,  and  if A >  1, then  the  left  hand  side  of( 43) is less
than  e,r  < a,r  +  oam Hence violating  both  conditions  induces  a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Theorem  3  Suppose  that  Cl  >  Cm.  Then  both C  1  and  C  2  are  satisfied  if  and  only  if  E(s)
{(O,  T(O)))
Proof:  We know from  Theorem  2 that  no interior  point  of F  can  be an  equilibrium;  thus  we consider  only
boundary  points  in  this  proof  Also,  since  middle  class  agents  are  risk  averse,  both  they  and  the  poor
support  a positive  level  of the  tax  at  any  k.  Hence  we can  rule out  any  points  of the  form  (k,  0).  We now
tackle  the  rest  of the  proof.
(Sufficiency)  First,  suppose  that  C 2 is violated.  Then  by Lemma 3, no point  (0, r) can  be a local  equilibrium,
since  there  exist  points  (k, r')  E W(O, r)  for some  k arbitrary  close  to  zero; hence  E(O)  is empty  for  any
open  ball  0  n Jr  around  (0, r)  . Next,  suppose  that  C  I is violated.  Then  at  k  =  0,  aU../ak  > 0;  this
fact  is easily seen  by differentiating  Urn partially  with  respect  to k and evaluating  at  k =  0.  By hypothesis,
6C  > Cm.  > C, so that  at  k =  0 we also  have aUllak  >  0.  Hence there  is majority  support  for a local  increase
in k.
We now need establish  sufficiency only for points  (k, 1). To rule out  these points,  we note  first that  the median
voter  theorem  implies  that  no point  (k, r)  with  r  $  r  (k) can  be  an  equilibrium.  Next,  by  Lemma  2,  if
WUm(k,  l)/dr  = 0, then  aUl;(k,  1)/4k  > 0.  Hence if aU1(k,  1)/alk > 0, (k, 1) can  be beaten  by a poor-middle
class  coalition  to  raise  k.  Then  we can  have equilibrium  at  (k, 1) only if  WUt(k,  1)/8k  < 0.  Differentiating
U 1 and  U.  partially  with respect  to  k, we have
aUi(k,  1)/ak  <  o  *  7  -y7
and
alfUm(k, l)8k  > o  X  >7m  (44)
Both  of these  conditions  hold  simultaneously  if and  only  if 61 <  Cm, which  violates  our  hypothesis.
Hence when  C I is violated,  the  equilibrium  set must  be empty.  Lastly,  if C  I is satisfied,  then  the rich and
the middle  class  both  favor reductions  in k whenever  k > 0, so only (0,1)  remains  as a posible  equilibrium.
But  Lemma  2 established  that  rT(0)  <  1.
Thus  we have established  sufficiency.
(Necessity)  Suppose  both  conditions  hold.  Then  by Lemma  3,  no point  (0, r)  can  be beaten  by  any point
with  k >  0.  Moreover,  by the  Median  Voter Theorem,  all points  (0, r),  r  $ r'(0),  are beaten  by (0, r'(0)).
Hence  (0, r'(0))  is the  unique  unbeaten  point,  establishing  its  solitary  membership  in E(r).
Q.E.D.
45Appendix  2:  Allowing positive earned income for the  poor
Our first step is to recaU that  (IC),  always wiU  bind.  As we noted  above, positive levels of transfers
are not possible when this constraint is violated, while both the poor and the middle class will want some
level of transfers.  Hence we have two regimes to consider: r  E (0,  1 -p]  and r E (I  - p,  1 - p/r].  While the
functions k'  and r  were defined for p = 0, nothing about them is changed for r  < 1 - p.  That  is, we may
retain the same analysis as before for the range [0,1 - p]  of r'  and the domain [0,  1 -p]  of k'.
Next, since we build moral hazard into the model, whenever r  >  I - pi employed middle class workers
will take p -marginal product jobs, so that  they receive untaxable earned income of p in any  "high-tax
regime".  Hence middle clas  agents' utility must be strictly increasing in r  for all r E (1 - a, 1 - p/r],  so
that both the middle class and the poor support a tax of 1-  p/r  when the high-tax regime is given. Though
the  rich will support  the  lowest tax  possible, just  as before, the  poor and  middle class form  a majority
coalition, so that  any high-tax regime equilibrium must occur at r = 1 - p/r.
Our method of eliminating points in the  high-tax regime as  possible equilibria is simple.  If we can
ensure that  the tax base always is sufficiently  small in the high-tax regime, then both N and O  will be lower
under this regime than  in the low-tax regime.  In this case, both the  poor and  the  middle clas-whether
employed or not-wiU vote for a tax of 1  - p instead of I - p/r,  no matter what value k takes. Thus for any
k, there will be unanimous support  against any point in the high-tax regime.
The condition we seek is simply
(a,r + qom)(1-)  >  erv(l-
which can be rewritten as
*iem + e,,(r  _  )-  P 
Hence if C 5 is satisfied, no point in the high-tax regime can be in E(F(p)).  We note that  Theorem 2
holds without modification for all X C T(p) \ [0,  1] x ( 1-  p), since the analysis for such subsets is unchanged
by p > 0.  With these facts in hand, we can state  a modified version of Theorem 3 in Corollary 1.
Corollary  1  Suppose that 6 a > 6m and p < p.  Then C I and C 2 are satisfied  if and only if (0, min[l -
p, r(0)])  E E
Proof: As before, we are entitled by Theorem 2 to ignore interior points; we now consider the boundaries of
J.
(Sufficiency) We want to show that  if (0, min(l - p, r(0)])  E E  then we must satisfy  both C  I  and
C 2.  First, if (0, min[l -,p,  r'(0)])  E E, then we must have single-crossing,  since otherwise there would exist
some point (k, r)  for which a rich-poor coalition would vote instead of (0, min(l -,p,  r  (O)]); since C 2 is
necesary  for single-crossing  at  k = 0, it must be satisfied. Third, C I also must hold, since otherwise we
have 61, 6m >  6, and thus a  poor-middle clans majority coalition exists for a local increase in k.  Hence we
have established sufficiency.
(Necessity)  We want to show that  if C I and C 2 are satisfied, then (0, min[l - p, r(0)])  E E. The argument
in the text above implies that  any point in E(F)I,.o  wiU beat any point in the high-tax regime, since any
such point beats all other points in F, which includes points (k, I - u), and any of these points unanimously
46beats  all points  (k, r),  r  >  I -jp.  Thus  we need consider  only points  in the  low-tax  regime.  If r(0)  < 1 -,
the  proof  of Theorem  3 establishes  the  result.  Hence we need  only consider  the  case  when  r'(0)  >  I - p.
By  the  same  median  voter  line  of argument  used  above,  (0,1  - p)  beats  all points  (0, r),  r  <  I  - p.  By
single crossing,  W(O, I - p) n (0, 1] x [0, 1 - ] = 0,  and  6m,  < T implies  the  existence  of a rich-middle  class
coalition  to defeat  all (k, 1 - IA), k > 0.  Hence W(O, I  - i)  n F(p)  = 0, so (0,1  - A)  E E.
Q.E.D.
The  observant  reader  will have noticed  that  in  the coroUary  we use  'E  E',  whereas  in conclusion  (ii)
of Theorem  3,  we had  "(0, r'(0))  =  E.  This  difference  is not  an  accident.  The  'lowering"  of  the  upper
bound  of  the low-tax  regime from  unity  to  I - p  may make  a difference-though  it  need  not.  The  intuitive
explanation  for this  fact  is that,  whereas  Lemma  2 establishes  that  at  a tax  of unity  VUm  0  0, no such  fact
need hold  at  a lower tax.  When  the  point  (k, I -it)  on the  upper  boundary  of F(p)  is a local  maximum,  i.e.
VUm(k,  I  - p)  =  0,  we may  be  able to support  that  point  as an  equilibrium  in F(pu) (i.e.  when  the  space
of alternatives  is restricted  to the low-tax  regime)  and  possibly  in Y  as well.  The  following lemma  lays  the
groundwork  for the  possible  existence  of equilibria  with  positive  levels of targeting  on the  boundary  of  the
low-tax  regime  when  js > 05
Lemma  9  Suppose  p =  0.  Then  C  1 is violated  if and  only if
(i)  U.  has a global  maximum  at  some point  (k, r),  k E (0, 1], r E (0,1)
(ii)  There  exists  at  least  one  local  maximum  (k, f)  E (0, 1] x  (0,1)  such  that  either  VUm(k,  r)  =  0 or
k =  I and aUn/3a  > 0 at (1, ;)
Proof:  (Sufficiency)  If C  I  is satisfied,  then  by  Lemma  1,  Urn is strictly  decreasing  in  k,  violating  (ii).
Moreover,  atUr/ak  <  OVk  >  0  implies  that  any  local  (and  hence  global)  maximum  occurs  at  k  =  0,
violating  (i).  Hence sufficiency is established.
(Ncesssty)  The first several  steps in proving both conclusions  are identical.  First,  since  6Im  > 6,  t9U.(O, r)/ak  >
0.  Second,  since  V <  q, from  Lemma  2 we know  that  at  least  one of aU ./.ak,  AU . /ar  =  0 at  any  point
(k, 1).  Third,  by risk  aversion,  aUrn(k,  0)/ar  > 0.  Therefore,  we have ruled  out  all points  having  k =  0 and
r  E  40, 1)  as candidates  for  VUm.(k, ;)  =  0 and  hence for  satisfying  the first  order  conditions  for  a global
maximum  (in each  case,  the conditions  are violated  in the  direction  that  implies  improvement  is feasible).
We  note  that  F  is compact  and  U,,  is continuous;  thus  Urn must  take  a maximum  on  F,  proving  (i).  To
prove  (ii),  note  that  VUm(i,  ;)  =  0 must  be satisfied  for any interior  maximum.  Then  we are left only  with
points  of the form  (1, r).  If aUm/alk < 0 at  such  points,  it is feasible  to improve  at  these  points  by reducing
k. Hence  either  VUm(k, i)  =  0 or  I  = 1 and aUrn/ak > 0 at  (1, ;)
Q.E.D.
Using this  lemma,  we are able to prove  Proposition  3, which establishes  conditions  for equilibria  to exist
on the  upper  boundary  of F(p).
Proposition  3  6i >  6m > T (and  thus C I is violated)  if and only if any local  maximum  (k, ;)  of UrnIao
with  k >  0 is a local  equilbrium  for  p =  I - ;.  Moreover,  for  all local equilibria  (k, f),  p  <  '  if and  only
if the set  over which (k, ;)  has equilibrium  status  can  be expanded  to the  union  of the  high-tax  regime  and
some open  ball  around  (k, f).
Proof:  (Sufficiency)  We  want  to  show that  if any  local  maximum  (k,;)  of UmI1,.o with  I  >  0 is a  local
equilbrium  for  A =  I - ;,  then 
6
L  2  6m  >  T for some  i  E  (0, 1].  If the  hypothesis  holds,  then  either
5 5Despite  the fact  that  we assume  p =  0 in the  lemma's  hypothesis.
47k  =  1 or  ;  =  0 or  we  must  have  single-crossing  (since  if  all of  these  are  violated,  it  is possible  to  find  a
rich-poor  coalition  in favor  of local  changes).  We  know  that  r  =  0  is never  optimal,  and  k  =  1 can  be
optimal  only  if C 1 is violated.  Hence we consider  points  with  )  < 1.  If C 1 holds,  then  a middle  class-rich
coalition  favors  local  reductions  in k.  Hence C  1 must  be  violated;  we have only  to show that  6t > bim. We
know  from  Theorem  2 that  no interior  point  of the  low-tax  regime  can  be  a local  equilibrium,  so we may
look only  at  points  on the  boundary  of the low-tax  regime, i.e.  points  (k, 1 - is) with  k E (0, 1).
Because these  points  are in the interior  of F,  the hypothesis  that  they  are local maxima  implies  VUm 1,-o  =  0.
Since  we have  assumed  that  Is  =  I - ;,  our local  maximum  of Um,,,.o  occurs  on the  boundary  of the  two
regimes,  so that  (IC)m  binds.  Hence the  poor  and  the  middle  class  have equal  consumption  in all  states
(though  the  differential  6  values  mean  the  probability  of  each  state's  occurrence  varies).  Under  these
circumstances,  an  argument  similar  to that  in the  proof  of Theorem  3 implies  that  aU/;lk  < 0 if and  only
if 65  < 6bm  (see  ( 44) ).  But if aUWa/k  < 0, then  there exists  a rich-poor  coalition  in favor of local  reductions
in k.  Hence  6, 2 6m if any local  maximum  is a local  equilibrium,  establishing  sufficiency.
(Necessitv)  We  want  to  show  that  if 6, 2  6m  >  6, there  exists  some  i, k  E  (0,1)  such  that  any  local
maximum  (1,;)  of  Um,. 6 ,.o  with  k  >  0 is a local  equilbrium  for A =  I  - ;.  First,  by Lemma  9,  we know
that  our  hypothesis  implies  the existence  either  of an interior  point  with  VUm =  0 or  a point  (1, f)  where
VUm  >  0.  In  the  first  case,  we have a maximum  on the  interior  of Um.IM.O,  implying  that  VUMI,.O  =  0.
Since  the  poor  and  the  middle class  again  have equal  consumption  in all states.  Then  6i >  6,,  implies  that
aU,/ak  > aUm,/8k = 0.  Hence no local  reduction  in k has  a majority;  no reduction  in r  does  either,  since
our  position  at  a relative  maximum  of UmIJ,.O means  that  we are on  r'(k).  Nor  is any  local  increase  in
either  variable  possible,  since the  middle class  are (locally)  maximizing  over both  and  the desire  of the  rich
to decrease  either  is  not  shared  by the  poor.  As for an  increase  in r,  this  will move  us into  the  high-tax
regime,  which implies  a discrete  reduction  in both  N  and 0.  Since our definition  of local equilibrium  requires
only  that  there  be  some open  ball for which the  point  is an equilibrium,  we can  always find  a small enough
c  >  0 such  that  no agreement  between  the  rich  and  poor  to  increase  r  to  r  + c while  reducing  k  will  be
possible.  In  the second  case,  where  k(f)  =  1, the  exact  same  argument  on all fronts  (except  that  we now
have  aUm/e9k > 0) establishes  the  result  a fortion.
As for  the last  comment,  regarding  A < j,  if this does  not hold,  any point  (k, I -pA) is beaten  by (k,  I -p/Ar)
via a poor-middle-class  coalition.  If the condition  does  hold,  then  (k, 1 - A) is unbeaten  by any  point  in the
high-tax  regime  (the  argument  here  is familiar).
Q.E.D.
Corollary  2  The asumptions  of Proposition  3 hold if and only if (k, I-  A) E E(Y(ip))  for some k and  A,
i.e.  there exists some A such that  the equilibrium set is non-empty when the alternative  space is restricted
to  the  low-tax  regime.  Moreover,  is  <  if and only  if (k, 1 - ip) E  E,  i.e.  iff  (k, 1 - A)  is an  equilibrium
over  all of T.
Proof:  We begin  with  the first  claim of the corollary.
(Sufficiency)  Suppose  that  (k, ;)  E  E(F(A)).  By the  argument  in  the  proof  of the  proposition,  this  point
must  also  be  a local equilbrium,  and  hence the  appropriate  conditions  must  hold.
(Necessity)  Suppose  that  the  assumptions  of  the  theorem  hold.  Then  by  Lemma  9,  there  is some  A such
that  (k,  1 - A) is a global  (and  hence  local)  maximum  of  UmIJ,.O.  By  Lemma  4,  violation  of  C  1 implies
that  we must  have single-crossing,  so that  no  rich-poor  coalition  can  defeat  (k, I  - A).  Since  this  point  is
a  global  maximum  in  F  when  p  =  0,  no majority  coalition  involving  the  middle  class  can  arise  to put  a
low-tax  regime  point  in  W(k,  I - A).  Familiar  arguments  imply  that  aUt/lk  > 0 > dU,/;1k,  which  means
48that  no coalition  can  stay  on  the low-tax  regime  boundary  and  impose  a new  k.  Hence  (k, 1 - A) must  be
an  equilibrium  over the  entire  low-tax  regime.
To show the  second claim  of the corollary,  if A < ,A, then  the point  (k, 1-i)  E W(k,  r)  for  any  (k, r)  in the
high  tax  regime  (the  unanimity  argument  gives the  result);  since  (k, 1 - )  was constructed  above  to  be in
E(Y(4)),  it must  therefore  also be in  E.  On  the other  hand,  if A > p',  (k, I-  ) is beaten  by (k, I-/r).
Hence A < p'  is necessary  and sufficient for  the  global maximum  to be  in E.
We note  that  a point  (i,  I  - A) satisfying  Corollary  2's  conclusions  need not  be  a global  maximum.  To
see this,  take  the smallest  ; for which (k, ;)  is a local maximum  of Uml,iJ.o.  Then  when  A =  I-;,  no other
maximum  of U".,o  is in the low-tax  regime,  so that  Corollary  2 applies.
The  results  of  this  section  notwithstanding,  one  shouldn't  get  too  excited  about  the  possibility  of
supporting  boundary  points  with  k >  0.  These  results  may  be invoked  only  in the  zero-probability  event
that  at  such  a point  is just  happens  to  be equal  to  1 - r(k)  at  a point  (k, r'(k))  that  is a local  maximum
of Urn.".  There  is therefore  no reason  to  believe that  the  equilibrium  set should  ever  contain  a point  with
k >  0,  at least  when  the set  of admissible  values  of k is all of [0,1].  That  said,  we stress  that  these  positive
results  concerning  the  viability  of positive  levels of targeting  have as necessary  conditions  both  the  violation
of  C  I  and  on  the  condition  that  6b >  6m :  even in the  extremely  unlikely  event  that  u does  satisfy  the
above  maximizing  condition,  it  must  be  the  case  that  targeted  benefits  are  widely  enough  received  if they
are to  be seen in any equilibrium.
56  The  sense  in which this  event  is zero-probability  is quite  precise:  for any continuous  distribution  of p
having  nondegenerate  support  over the set [0,1],  the probability  that  any given value  of p  is 'drawn"  is zero
by definition;  since  Umn  will always  have a countable  number  of maxima,  the set  of  u values  for which  I - p
is a maximum  has  measure  zero.
49Appendix  3:  Theoretical  Generalization  With  Altruism
Lemma  5 (When  Altruistic  Middle  Class  Agents  Oppose  Targeting)
(i)  Suppose  C 3 is satisfied.  Then  al9/rn/k  < 0 for k =  0.
(ii)  Suppose  that  C  4  is  satisfied  and  that  utilities  are  of  the  CRRA  form,  with  p  <  1.  Then
82Vm/8kir  < 0 for  k = 0.
Proof:
(i)  At k  =  0 we have
(CM)1 I  k  =  a[pu'(N)  + qu'(N  + 1  - r)](  . - 1) + (I  - t)[pu'(N)  + qu'(N  + p)](  =  - 1)
Since we want  to make this expression  negative,  and since the terms multiplied  by u'(N)  and u'(N+l-r)
are  negative  if  C  3 holds,  we  may  replace  them  by  something  smaller;  1  will  be  a  convenient  choice.  57
Reorganizing  thus  yields
ir  [ca6,m  + (1 - a)6i  - 'p + 6[a(6m  - 6) + (1 - a)(6/  - lu'(p  +  N)]q
If we then  multiply  through  by 6, recognize  that  u'(p  + N)  < u'(p)  and  also add  and subtract  the  term
q(l - cr)(6i - 6), simple  algebra  may  be used to show that  C 3 is indeed  a sufficient  condition  for negativity.
(ii)  We write  the  crosspartial  derivative  as the sum  A + B - C,  where,  using  the  CRRA  assumption,
these  three  terms  are defined  as foUows:
A  py(l  - p)u'(N)[a6(  + (I  -)bJ
B  q(l  - p)[a(--  - l)u'(N  + 1  - r)  + (1 - a)(  -_)u'(p  + N)]
C  q[ct(=  -)u-  (  + 1-r)  +  (1-a)(  l)u  (p  )]
C  6
With  p  <  1, A  is clearly  nonpositive.  To see  that  B  is an well, again  multiply  through  by 6, replace
U'(N + 1 - r)  with  unity,  and  add  and  subtract  q(l  - a)(6u - 6).  This  procedure  yields  C 4,  establishing
nonpositivity  of B.  C  wil  be  negative  if  and only if
[&6,n  + (I1- a)6s]u"(N + 1-  r)  + (1- a)(61- T)[pgun(N  + p)u"(N  + 1-  r)]  > Tu"(N + 1-  r),
which will hold  if and  only  if
cv6m  + (  -a )61  + (1 -a)(61  ~  ts"(N +I)  -1]  <p u"(N  + I - r
This  condition  differs  from  C 4 only by the  fact  that  the first  term  in the  brackets  on  the  LHS is not
u'(p).  Therefore  we would  have our  result  if it could be shown  that
u"(N+I-r)
Using  the  CRRA  asumption  (actually,  all we really  need  is non-decreasing  relative  risk  aversion  and
the  normalization  u'(l)  =  1),  this  condition  may  be  written  as  p <  -u"(N  + 1 - r),  which  reduces  even
further  to (N  + I -r)-(  +)  >  1, which is true since  N + I  - r <  1.  Hence C  must  be strictly  negative.
Q.E.D.
57As risk aversion  and  the degree of altruism  jointly  approach  zero, so does  r"(0),  so that  u'(N+  I -r)  will
be arbitrarily  close to u'(l),  which we normalize  to unity.  Given this fact,  any condition  held  to  be sufficient
over all parameter  values  (with  k fixed at  zero)  must  be  able to  handle  replacement  of u'(N  + 1 - r)  with
unity.  Replacing  u'(N)  with  unity  is for mathematical  convenience,  and clearly  adds  slack  to the condition,
since  this  term  is bounded  below  by u'(N)  >  u'(F)  >  1. Nonetheless,  the precision  gained  by so doing  does
not  seem  worth  the  loss in expository  convenience.
50Lemma  7  (Adaptation  of  the  Single-Crossing  Result  to  the  Introduction  of  Altruism)  Both
dn/dk  > dr./dk  and aV,/cr  < 0 if and only if both dn/dk  > df;/dk  and aV1/ak  < 0.
Proof:  Define  a _  6UI/ak,  b _  (1 - l)aU/ak,  c =_#U/ar,  and  d _  (1 - fl)WU1/ar.  Then  we can  write
df./dk  =-(a  + b)/(c + d), dr7/dk  _-a/c,  and dn/dk  _-bld.
(Suficiency)  Hence  we have dn/dk  > dfr/dk  if and only if
b  a +  (
Since b, d > 0, a + b  aVI/ak  < 0 implies  that  ( 45) can  hold only if c + d  =-alar  <  0.  Simple  algebra
may  be  used  to  show that  if c + d  _aV/Or  <  0, ( 45) may  be reduced  to -bd  > -a/c,  which  is another
way of writing  dn/dk  > drl/dk.  Hence sufficiency is established.
(Necessity)  Start  with  the  following two assertions:  c + d <  0 and  -bd  > -a/c,  which  form  the  Lemma's
joint  hypothesis.  Simple  algebra  again  yields  truth  of  ( 45);  together  with  and  b, d  >  O >  c + d,  this  fact
now  requires  that  a + b _  aVr/Ok  < 0, establishing  necessity.
Q.E.D.
Lemma  S  Suppose  that  utilities  are  CRRA  with  p <  1,  and  that  0  >  (>)cr,  i.e.  rich  agents  weight
gown'  utility  at  least  as heavily  as do middle  class ones.  Then  -v  1h.o = 0 implies  that  9v;  Iko  < 0.
Proof:  Note  first  that  aV./ar  > aKV/ar  reduces  to
aU"  - 3Ur  > (a -)U(,  (46)
where  the  RHS  is non-negative.  A lower  bound  for U1" is -u'(N  + I - r)(q  -y).  Hence  the  LHS of  ( 46)
will be  positive  if
- jI)u'(r  - y  (r  - r  ))  > oru'(N  + 1 - r)(q  - y),  (47)
which can be expressed as
p(r -')  >( r -r(r-Y  F)Y  (48)
The LHS of  this  inequality  lies  in the interval  [Br/aq,  oo], while the  RHS  lies  in the  interval  [1, r"],  so
that p < I implies  that  the  RHS is bounded  below r.  Since  6 >  or and  r >  q, the  LHS is bounded  above  r,
proving the lemma.
Q.E.D.
Proposition  2  Suppose the conditions of Lemmas 6- 8 are satisfied. Then (k,r)  E Cr(f)  implies that
neither  (k,  )  nor  (k, r)  is in A(k,  r).
Proof:  Let  TL(k,r)  5  L,(k, r)  and  let  L,(k,  r)  be  connected.  Then  for  V,(O, r)  =  V,  the  foUowing  two
functions  will exist  and  be continuous  and  differentiable  over  their  respective  domains:
r,+  : K+(7)  [O,  1]  (49)
and
Tr:  K-(V)-_  [0,l]  (50)
where
K+(V)  k : 3 r E [0, I]s.t. V,(k, r)  = Vand  '(k)  > 0}  (51)
Or
and  K-  is defined  analogously,  but  with  BV,-k,`)  <  0.  (Note  that  rr+(k; V)  = r,  (k; V)  at  any  point  where
av,/Or  = 0.)
Next,  Lemmas 6  and  7 guarantees that  F,,  i  {Ej+,-}, are  wholly contained  in the  set  B,(0,f).
Suppose  that  (k,,r)  E C,(;).  Then  4(F;V)  =  r0 for  V,(O,r)  =  V and  i  E  {+,-}.  Suppose  now  that
a,(k,  r.)/ar  >  0,  which  is to say  that  i =  +  Then  by  Lemma  6,  there  exists  a  ri  <  r,(k;  U,(0,  f;)  for
which dV,(k,  r)/lr  < 0 and  V,(0, ri)  =  V, which  is to say that  -r,(F;  V) = r1. By concavity  of  V, in its
second  argument,  altruistic  rich  agents'  utility  must  be  decreasing  in r  for  all r  >  ri  when  k is held  at  T.
51Since V,(T,ri)  =  V, it  therefore must be true that  Vr(Tk,)  < VVr  >  ri.  But  Ui(l,r)  <  U  Uz(O,t)
for all r  <  n (k;U),  while this  latter  value exceeds r.(k; Ur(O,  f))  (by single crossing between poor  and
non-altruistic rich agents), which itself exceeds ri,  proving that  A(O,  ;)  must  be empty for all points (i, r)
such that  there exists some r.  for which (k, rO)  E Cr(;).
As for points (k0, T), the Proposition's result follows  directly by defining functions F, and domains r
with i E {+,-},  noting the concavity of V. in its first argument, and proceeding as with the Tr functions.
Q.E.D.
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